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Homosexual Public Employees:
Utilizing Section 1983 to Remedy
Discrimination
By PENN M. CLARK*
Section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code" was en-
acted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 18712 against the backdrop
of the Reconstruction Era, and provides a statutory remedy for
constitutional violations which occur under color of state law. Also
known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, its legislative history reflects con-
gressional concern for the plight of blacks and black sympathizers
subjected to egregious discriminatory treatment in the post-civil
war period.$
For nearly eighty years, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 remained a viable
but seldom utilized tool to eradicate discrimination under color of
state law and to recompense victims of such discrimination. In the
1960's a renewed campaign against discrimination in several sec-
tors of society led to increased section 1983 litigation, including
challenges to discriminatory employment practices. Legislative, as
well as judicial, action in that decade led to greater protection for
members of suspect classes, 4 without requiring a surrender of rem-
edies allowed under section 1983.5 Individuals of non-suspect clas-
* J.D., 1976, University of Miami; LL.M., 1980, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1980) provides: "Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
2. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
3. See, e.g., A. ALVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDmzNTs' DEBATEs (1967) for discus-
sion of congressional debates.
4. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701-718, as amended
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
5. The Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.
454 (1975) emphasized the independent nature of remedies provided by the Reconstruction
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ses, such as homosexuals, have not had the benefit of extensive
protective legislation. Although forty members of Congress have
sponsored an amendment to Title VII which would prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual preference, that legislation has
failed to gain the support necessary for passage.6
Political activism of the homosexual community commenced
in the summer of 1969, when over four hundred homosexuals gath-
ered in the streets of Greenwich Village for several nights to pro-
test police raids on the Stonewall Inn, a homosexual bar. For
these individuals, political activism has often led to legislative and
social defeat. In 1978, New York City defeated legislation prohibit-
ing housing and employment discrimination on the basis of sexual
preference, and in 1979 the Connecticut House of Representatives
followed suit.8 Ordinances favoring gay rights have been repealed
in Wichita, Kansas; St. Paul, Minnesota; Eugene, Oregon, and
Dade County, Florida.9 But homosexual activism has also enjoyed
its successes. The District of Columbia and Minneapolis are among
the thirty-nine cities, towns and counties that have enacted anti-
discrimination ordinances. 10 In November of 1978, in California,
homosexuals and supporters of homosexual rights defeated by a
three-to-two margin a proposition which would have permitted
school boards to fire openly homosexual teachers."' As a result, the
debate surrounding employment of homosexuals is currently more
open and more controversial than ever before in this nation's his-
tory. And the legislative processes have, at best, moved slowly,
often prodded by judicial action which protects and secures indi-
vidual rights while chastising legislative sloth or inflexibility. For
instance, the Civil Service Commission removed a blanket disap-
proval of hiring homosexuals in a 1973 bulletin as a result of fed-
eral litigation in cases such as Norton v. Macy.1 2 In the absence of
legislative guidelines, some segments of society, such as corporate
entities and universitites, have established their own guidelines
Civil Rights Acts and Title VII. See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
6. See H.R. 166, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 8581 (1975).




11. Id. at 73.
12. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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and policies to deal with the homosexual applicant or employee.
AT&T and IBM are among the major corporations that honor a
policy prohibiting discrimination in hiring or promotion based on
sexual preference.1 s Harvard Law School prohibits firms that dis-
criminate against homosexuals from utilizing its placement
services.14
While legislators have, in large measure, indicated their reluc-
tance to deal with this controversial issue, judges have been, and
will likely continue to be, instrumental in dealing with employ-
ment discrimination regarding homosexuals. This combination of
legislative inaction and political activism on the part of homosexu-
als has and will lead to more extensive litigation in this area. Be-
cause revitalization of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 has not been
limited in application to suspect class members,1 5 section 1983 pro-
vides the homosexual applicant or employee with a direct and
readily applicable tool that cuts swiftly to the heart of public em-
ployment discrimination.
By its terms, section 1983 is limited to public employment
cases in which a state action element is present, and it affords pro-
tection for United States citizens and aliens within the jurisdiction
of the United States. Section 1983 prohibits any person from "the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws."'16 The party injured may pursue legal or
equitable action for redress.17 The doctrine of governmental immu-
nity, which previously had the effect of blunting section 1983's use-
fulness, was re-examined in Monell v. Department of Social Ser-
vices, 18  which duly circumscribed the immunity accorded
municipalities.19
13. TIME, Apr. 23, 1979, at 73.
14. Id. at 75.
15. See, e.g., Cullen v. New York State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 435 F. Supp. 546 (E.D.
N.Y. 1977), appeal dismissed, 566 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1977); Gurmankin v. Constanzo, 411 F.
Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d. Cir. 1977).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1980).
17. Id.
18. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
19. Id. at 700-01: "[T]he overruling of Monroe insofar as it holds that local govern-
ments are not 'persons' who may be defendants in § 1983 suits is clearly proper. It is simply
beyond doubt that, under the 1871 Congress' view of the law, were,§ 1983 liability unconsti-
tutional as to local governments, it would have been equally unconstitutional as to state
officers. Yet everyone... knew that § 1983 would be applied to state officers and nonethe-
less stated that § 1983 was constitutional ... [T]here can be no doubt that § 1 of the Civil
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One of the most litigious and interesting aspects of a section
1983 action for employment discrimination involves examination of
the protectable interests which a party can assert. A particular in-
terest asserted by an individual will, in large measure, determine
not only whether he will be awarded relief, but also what form of
relief he will receive and what particular test or analysis the court
will apply to his case. Homosexual litigants have asserted interests
ranging from the right of association and speech to property rights
and the right of privacy embodied in the liberty aspect of the
Fourteenth Amendment.20 This article will examine the interrela-
tionship of the protected interests which the homosexual litigant
may raise and the standards against which the courts measure
agency action.
I. Norton v. Macy: The Nexus Requirement
Norton involved the removal of a protected 1 federal employee
from his post as a budget analyst for the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) in 1963 for off-duty, homosexual
conduct. Morals officers observed Norton pull his car to a curb,
pick up one Procter, drive around the block once, and drop Procter
off at the pickup point. Both individuals were arrested, possibly
after Procter informed police that Norton felt his leg and invited
him to Norton's apartment. Two hours of interrogation regarding
sexual history followed, a portion of which was monitored incog-
nito by NASA's security chief. Upon release, Norton was taken to
a deserted NASA building by the security chief and further inter-
rogated. During the interrogation at NASA, Norton allegedly ad-
mitted that he had engaged in homosexual activity during his high
school and college days, and that he may have engaged in homo-
sexual activity twice during blackout periods, after drinking. He
allegedly admitted to having blacked out after meeting Procter.
In his formal reply to the notice of proposed dismissal, Norton
Rights Act was intended to provide a remedy... against all forms of official violation of
federally protected rights. Therefore, absent a clear statement in the legislative history sup-
porting the conclusion that § 1 was not to apply to the official acts of a municipal corpora-
tion-which simply is not present-there is no justification for excluding municipalities
from the 'persons' covered by § 1."
20. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
21. The appellant, as a veteran, enjoyed extraordinary civil service protection afforded
by the Veterans' Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7512(a) (1976). See 417 F.2d at 1162.
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denied his homosexual status, his knowing participation in homo-
sexual activity as an adult, and making a homosexual advance to
Procter. NASA accepted Procter's contention that the homosexual
advance had occurred and found Norton unsuitable for retention
as a government employee because he engaged in "infamous....
immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct."22 NASA's action was
upheld upon agency review.23
Norton filed an action in district court contending that his dis-
missal violated the constitutional mandate of due process.24 The
Civil Service Commission's motion for summary judgment was
granted,2 5 but on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that Norton was unlawfully discharged.26
The court of appeals accepted the lower court's finding that a ho-
mosexual advance occurred, and framed the issue in terms of
whether the homosexual advance or Norton's personality traits as
evidenced in the record constituted "such cause [for removal] as
will promote the efficiency of the service. "27
The court first examined its authority to review the agency de-
termination by defining the constitutional limits of such a discre-
tionary determination. While the government, as employer, has
substantial discretion in determining bases for removal, the re-
moval must comport with both procedural and substantive due
process limitations. 8 Substantively, due process forbids removal
for arbitrary and capricious reasons.29 These substantive limita-
tions are more expansive when the removal action results in affix-
ing a stigma to the employee or intruding upon his right to pri-
vacy. 0 In contrast to procedural due process limitations, the
substantive limitations apply with equal force to protected and un-
protected employees.31 The court thus recognized the need for ju-
dicial review of allegations that the employer's removal action was
22. 5 C.F.R. § 731.201(b) (1975).
23. 417 F.2d at 1163.
24. Id. at 1163-64.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1168.
27. Id. at 1163.
28. See id. at 1164.
29. See id. (citing Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) and
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)).
30. See 417 F.2d at 1164.
31. See id.
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unreasonable in that there was no rational basis for the conclusion
that the removal in question promoted service efficiency.
Although the government could find Norton's conduct "im-
moral" when viewed against the prevailing standards of society,
this finding, standing alone, was, for two reasons, an insufficient
basis for dismissal in the absence of a showing that "all immoral or
indecent acts of an employee have some ascertainable deleterious
effect on the efficiency of the service." '32 First, "the notion that it
could be an appropriate function of the federal bureaucracy to en-
force the majority's conventional codes of conduct in the private
lives of its employees is at war with elementary concepts of liberty,
privacy, and diversity."33 Second, "the statute precludes [the gov-
ernment] from discharging protected employees except for a rea-
son related to the efficiency of the service. ' '34
On the basis of this due process analysis, the court concluded
that charges against Norton required NASA to prove a nexus be-
tween Norton's off-duty conduct and actual or probable impair-
ment of service efficiency in order to justify Norton's dismissal.
The court distinguished the earlier case of Dew v. Halaby,3 5 on
the grounds that Norton, unlike the plaintiff in Dew, was a long-
time employee who did not occupy a sensitive position. However,
the court noted the finding in Dew, that homosexual conduct could
impair service efficiency. Homosexual conduct which evidences an
unstable personality, provokes adverse reactions from personnel
with whom the homosexual worker must interact, or renders the
homosexual subject to blackmail may supply a nexus which, in
some instances, will justify dismissal.36 These factors were admit-
tedly absent in Norton, leaving only custom and potential agency
embarrassment to supply a connection between Norton's conduct
and service efficiency.3 7
It is the government who has the burden, in a Norton situa-
tion, of establishing a specifc nexus between employee conduct and
service efficiency: "A reviewing court must at least be able to dis-
32. Id. at 1165.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 376 U.S. 904, cert. dismissed by
agreement of the parties, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
36. See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d at 1166.
37. Id. at 1167.
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cern some reasonably forseeable, specific connection between an
employee's potentially embarrassing conduct and the efficiency of
the service."38 Once this nexus has been established, the substan-
tive aspect of due process is satisfied, and the agency is then free
to determine whether service efficiency is best furthered by dismis-
sal of the employee.3 9
In Norton, the government failed to meet its burden of estab-
lishing this nexus, and thus its dismissal was held to be arbitrary.
The court noted that "on the record . .. [Norton] is at most an
extremely infrequent offender, who neither openly flaunts nor
carelessly displays his unorthodox sexual conduct in public. Thus,
even the potential for the embarrassment the agency fears is
minimal. '4
0
Although Norton involved a due process assault on the gov-
ernment's attempt to dismiss an alleged homosexual, it also raised
matters of vital importance to section 1983 litigants. Norton estab-
lished the existence of substantive due process limitations that cor-
relate with the protected interests assertable by homosexual liti-
gants who are public employees, and reaffirmed the judiciary's role
in assuring agency compliance with these limitations.
The Norton court recognized the need for expansive due pro-
cess limitations where adverse employment action has the impact
of stigmatizing an individual and thus affecting his opportunity to
pursue a legitimate livelihood. It reaffirmed the existence of a sac-
rosanct sphere of privacy in the off-duty lives of public employees.
Absent a clear area of intersection between the employee's on-duty
and off-duty lives, there is no nexus to support an adverse employ-
ment action. Finally, Norton established the rational basis test as a
device to measure the discretionary adverse employment action




41. Norton states: "In other cases, we have recognized that, besides complying with
statutory procedural requirements, the employer agency must demonstrate some 'rational
basis' for its conclusion that a discharge 'will promote the efficiency of the service.'" Id. at
1164 (footnote omitted). As a practical matter, the factual and legal analysis in Norton fol-
lowed this rational basis standard.
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II. Protected Interests
The § 1983 plaintiff must be prepared to show that he has been
acted against for a constitutionally prohibited reason, or under a
constitutionally repugnant standard, or for no reason
whatsoever.42
Adverse employment actions directed against public employ-
ees or applicants may result in deprivation of property and/or lib-
erty interests.43 Among the protected interests a homosexual liti-
gant may assert in section 1983 actions are property, reputation,
due process, equal protection, speech and association, and privacy.
The interest which the litigant asserts will determine the availabil-
ity and nature of relief afforded by the courts. For example, suc-
cessful assertion of a property right in employment may afford a
reinstatement remedy, but not a grant of backpay where the liti-
gant successfully asserts a constitutional deprivation." In addition,
the protected interest the litigant asserts may determine the
framework for the court's analysis and the standard against which
agency action is measured. 5
In similar fashion, the homosexual litigant's status may be de-
terminative of the protected interests he can assert. A tenured
teacher could assert a property interest in continued employ-
ment,46 but the applicant for a teaching position would be limited
to asserting deprivation of a liberty interest.47
A. Property Rights
Litigation involving property rights normally emphasizes pro-
42. Wishart v. McDonald, 500 F.2d 1110, 1115 (1st Cir. 1974).
43. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Court stated: "There might
be cases in which a State refused to reemploy a person under such circumstances that inter-
ests in liberty would be implicated. But this is not such a case." Id. at 573. See also
Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
44. Compare remedies awarded in Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School
No. 5, 353 F. Supp. 254 (D. Or. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975), and Board of Educ. v. Jack M., 19 Cal. 3d 691, 566 P.2d 602,
139 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1977).
45. Compare the nexus requirement in Norton and Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1
Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969) with the balancing test in Mt. Healthy
City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) and Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
563 (1968).
46. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972).
47. See, e.g., McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1046 (1972).
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cedural due process infringements. However, a bona fide property
right to continued employment is also important, as it may be the
only constitutionally protected right the homosexual public em-
ployee litigant can assert. Alternately, the nature or existence of a
property right may be determinative of the remedy the court
affords.
A definitive property interest in continued employment may
be established through an actual statutory or regulatory tenure
system.48 Tenure in the teaching profession, for example, may be
based on state statutes prescribing licensing or tenure require-
ments or internal university regulations or policy statements estab-
lishing tenure requisites.49 In addition, an individual may achieve
tenure and, thus, obtain a constitutionally protected property in-
terest based on a non-regulatory or de facto system. In Perry v.
Sindermann,50 the Supreme Court recognized the merit of such a
claim.
48. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972).
49. Compare the tenure policies of the state of Texas and Odessa College, the effects
of which were at issue in Perry. The State's policy statement read:
"A. Tenure
"Tenure means assurance to an experienced faculty member that he may expect to con-
tinue in his academic position unless adequate cause for dismissal is demonstrated in a fair
hearing, following established procedures of due process.
"A specific system of faculty tenure undergirds the integrity of each academic institu-
tion. In the Texas public colleges and universities, this tenure system should have these
components:
"(1) Beginning with appointment to the rank of full-time instructor or a higher rank,
the probationary period for a faculty member shall not exceed seven years, including within
this period appropriate full-time service in all institutions of higher education. This is sub-
ject to the provision that when, after a term of probationary service of more than three
years in one or more institutions, a faculty member is employed by another institution, it
may be agreed in writing that his new appointment is for a probationary period of not more
than four years (even though thereby the person's total probationary period in the academic
profession is extended beyond the normal maximum of seven years).
"(3) Adequate cause for dismissal for a faculty member with tenure may be established
by demonstrating professional incompetence, moral turpitude, or gross neglect of profes-
sional responsibilities." 408 U.S. at 600-01 n.6 (quoting from the Coordinating Board of the
Texas College & University System, Policy Paper I (Oct. 16, 1967)).
Odessa College's policy statement read: "Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure
system. The administration of the College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has
permanent tenure as long as his teaching services are satisfactory and as long as he displays
a cooperative attitude toward his co-workers and his superiors, and as long as he is happy in
his work" 408 U.S. at 600.
50. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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A teacher, ... who has held his position for a number of
years, might be able to show from the circumstances of this ser-
vice-and from other relevant facts-that he has a legitimate
claim of entitlement to job tenure. ... [T]here may be an un-
written "common law" in a particular university that certain em-
ployees shall have the equivalent of tenure ...
[R]ules and understandings, promulgated and fostered by
state officials,. . may justify his legitimate claim of entitlement
to continued employment absent "sufficient cause." 51
A property right, at its minimum, must be based on a mutual
agreement giving rise to a reasonable, that is objective versus sub-
jective, expectation of continued employment. 52 Because property
rights are created by sources external to the Constitution, the liti-
gant asserting such an interest must be familiar with the external
source that determines the scope of his tenure rights. The Consti-
tution affords protection only for the scope of the property rights
substantively defined by the external source.53 In Bishop v.
Wood,5 the Supreme Court adopted the plurality opinion of Ar-
nett v. Kennedy5" and found there was no deprivation of a prop-
erty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
A property interest in employment can, of course, be created by
ordinance, or by an implied contract. In either case, however, the
sufficiency of the claim of entitlement must be decided by refer-
ence to state law ... Whether such a guarantee has been given
can be determined only by an examination of the particular stat-
ute or ordinance in question.56
In Bishop, because North Carolina law specified that an em-
ployment contract of indeterminate length was terminable at the
will of either party, the Supreme Court found the plaintiff's em-
ployment terminable at will, thus affording no definitive property
interest.57 Therefore, the courts will disregard the external sources'
51. Id. at 602-03.
52. See Roth: "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have
more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expecta-
tion of it." 408 U.S. at 577. Perry: "We disagree with the Court of Appeals insofar as it
held that a mere subjective 'expectancy' is protected by procedural due process. .. "Id. at
603. See also Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
53. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
54. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
55. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
56. 426 U.S. at 344-45.
57. Id. at 345-47.
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delineation of the property right only if it is contrary to constitu-
tional standards. 8
For public employees who work directly for the federal or
state government, tenure is usually stated in terms of a prohibition
of dismissal or discipline except upon a showing of cause.59 Norton
clearly established the proposition that the federal government has
the burden of proving a nexus between an employee's performance
on the job and his homosexuality, if that sexual preference is being
used as a basis for adverse action and the employee possesses a
right to continue in his job. 0 Thus, due process encompasses not
only procedural, but also substantive safeguards, specifically
against arbitrary and capricious action by the agency employer.
The judiciary has extended the nexus requirement in Norton to
public personnel cases in the state sector, thus affording protection
against arbitrary and capricious action for state employees whose
tenure rights are stated in terms similar to those in Norton.6 1
For employees of state agencies such as school boards, the "for
cause" requirement may either be stated in terms of a prohibition
similar to the regulation in Norton, or as a positive grant of dis-
missal authority for specific reasons, such as immorality or crimi-
nal conduct.62 However, as in Norton, attaching a label to the con-
duct or the individual does not suffice to relieve the agency of its
duty to establish the necessary nexus. 3
The nexus requirement provides, in effect, substantive due
process. The nexus requirement may be asserted either as a sepa-
rate substantive right to due process (as in a liberty interest case)
or it may be cited as the standard by which the deprivation of a
property interest is to be judged.6 ' In the latter context, the exter-
58. See id. at 350.
59. See, e.g., Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1163. Compare the language of the regu-
lation in Norton with that in Safransky v. State Personnel Bd., 62 Wis. 2d 464, 474, 215
N.W.2d 379, 384 (1974).
60. 417 F.2d at 1167.
61. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Jack M., 19 Cal. 3d 691, 566 P.2d 602, 139 Cal. Rptr.
700 (1977); Safransky v. State Personnel Bd., 62 Wis. 2d 464, 215 N.W.2d 379 (1974).
62. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Jack M., 19 Cal. 3d 691, 566 P.2d 602, 139 Cal. Rptr.
700 (1977).
63. See, e.g., Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965), appeal after remand, 402
F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 230, 461 P.2d 375,
386, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175, 187 (1969); contra, Schlegel v. United States, 416 F.2d 1372 (Ct. Cl.
1969); Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340 (1977).
64. See notes 106-71 and accompanying text infra.
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nal source assumes importance in light of Bishop's holding that
the external source defines the substantive scope of employment
rights. The Norton-Bishop situation, in which the external source
delineates specific bases upon which just cause may be found, is
relatively common. The importance of the external source and its
relationship as a measuring standard for a nexus was illustrated in
Morrison v. State Board of Education,65 where the State Board of
Education sought to revoke Morrison's lifetime teaching certificate.
In Morrison, the court found that such general terms as moral tur-
pitude and unprofessional conduct in "[1]egislation authorizing dis-
ciplinary action against the holders of a variety of certificates, li-
censes and government jobs" drew their "precise meaning by
referring in each case to the particular profession or the specific
government position to which they were applicable."' 6 Thus, the
nexus was expressed in terms of the adverse impact an individual's
homosexual conduct had upon his particular job.
The attempted revocation of Morrison's teaching certificate
was predicated upon a finding that his participation in a homosex-
ual relationship was indicative of "immoral and unprofessional
conduct and acts involving moral turpitude. 6 7 The court examined
numerous licensing and employment cases involving interpretation
of broad terms such as "unprofessional conduct." 68 The court's ap-
proach in previous situations was cognizant of the fact that, "[fun
using [these general terms] the Legislature surely did not mean to
endow the employing agency with the power to dismiss any em-
ployee whose personal, private conduct incurred its disapproval;
[h]ence the courts have consistently related the terms to the issue
of whether, when applied to the performance of the employee on
65. 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969). Although Morrison involved
license revocation, the courts have specifically applied its analysis to adverse employment
actions directed against homosexual state sector employees,
66. Id. at 220, 461 P.2d at 379, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
67. Id. at 217, 461 P.2d at 377, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
68. Id. at 220-24, 461 P.2d at 379-82, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 179-82 (discussing Yakov v.
Board of Medical Examiners, 68 Cal. 2d 67, 435 P.2d 553, 64 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1968); Hallinan
v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966); Board
of Educ. v. Swan, 41 Cal. 2d 546, 261 P.2d 261 (1953) Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 36
Cal. 2d 734, 227 P.2d 449 (1951); Board of Trustees v. Owens, 206 Cal. App. 2d 147, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 710 (1962); Jarvella v. Willoughby-Eastlake City School Dist., 12 Ohio Misc. 288, 233
N.E.2d 143 (1967)). See also Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d at 227-28 n.21, 461
P.2d at 385 n.21, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 185 n.21.
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the job, the employee has disqualified himself." 9 The court ex-
pressed concern that the standard of conduct reflect a rather stable
consensus regarding the nature of adverse conduct that could im-
pact upon the relationship between a specific teacher and his stu-
dents or co-workers. "No such consensus can be presumed about
'morality.' ")70
In conclusion, the court held that "the Board of Education
cannot abstractly characterize the conduct in this case as 'im-
moral,' 'unprofessional,' or 'involving moral turpitude' within the
meaning of section 13202 of the Education Code unless that con-
duct indicates that the petitioner is unfit to teach. 7 1 The standard
which the court set for determining unfitness to teach was "a
showing that his retention in the profession poses a significant
danger of harm to either students, school employees, or others who
might be affected by his actions as a teacher.
7 2
As in the Norton case, the Supreme Court of California noted
general factors which may be considered in determining fitness to
teach and applied those factors to the specific facts in Morrison.
[T]he board may consider such matters as the likelihood that the
conduct may have adversely affected students or fellow teachers,
the degree of such adversity anticipated, the proximity or remote-
ness in time of the conduct, the type of teaching certificate held
by the party involved, the extenuating or aggravating circum-
stances, if any, surrounding the conduct, the praiseworthiness or
blameworthiness of the motives resulting in the conduct, the like-
lihood of the recurrence of the questioned conduct, and the ex-
tent to which disciplinary action may inflict an adverse impact or
chilling effect upon the constitutional rights of the teacher in-
volved or other teachers.78
Applying these factors to Morrison, the court found that unfit-
ness to teach was not demonstrated. Morrison had engaged in a
limited and noncriminal homosexual relationship with another
man approximately six years prior to the license revocation. The
evidence demonstrated that Morrison had engaged in no subse-
quent homosexual conduct, that the incident had not adversely af-
69. Id. at 225, 461 P.2d at 382, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
70. Id. at 226, 461 P.2d at 383, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
71. Id. at 229, 461 P.2d at 386, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
72. Id. at 235, 461 P.2d at 391, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
73. Id. at 229, 461 P.2d at 386, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
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fected his working relationship with other individuals at the
school, that his "motives at the time of the incident involved
neither dishonesty nor viciousness, and [that] the emotional pres-
sures on both petitioner and Schneringer suggest[ed] the presence
of extenuating circumstances." 4 There was no evidence that "peti-
tioner's conduct in any manner affected his performance as a
teacher. . . . [or] that petitioner had ever attempted, sought, or
even considered any form of physical or otherwise improper rela-
tionship with any student .... [or] that petitioner had failed to
impress upon the minds of his pupils the principles of morality."' "5
Finally, there was an absence of notoriety. 6
The license revocation and adverse employment action cases
which have followed Morrison have largely adhered to the factor
analysis delineated in that case." Although no single specific factor
has emerged as a primary determinant regarding nexus, certain
factors have been cited with great frequency. These include ab-
sence or presence of notoriety connected with the conduct, whether
the act was committed in a public or private arena, whether or not
the conduct constituted a crime, the presence or absence of advo-
cacy as relates to homosexual conduct or homosexuality as a way
of life and whether or not homosexual overtures or statements oc-
curred in the job setting.7 8 Unfitness to teach (or unfitness to per-
form any specific job) is an issue of fact,79 and a review of cases in
this area reveals no standard formula for weighing the significance
of specific factors. There exists no generalized rule of law in this
area, but rather the courts engage in an ad hoc determination on
the basis of all of the facts in any specific case. 80
Substantively, the nexus requirement imposed in a property
74. Id. at 237, 461 P.2d at 392, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 235, 461 P.2d at 391, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
77. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Jack M., 19 Cal. 3d 691, 566 P.2d 602, 139 Cal. Rptr.
700 (1977); Moser v. State Bd. of Educ., 22 Cal. App. 3d 988, 101 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1972); Board
of Trustees v. Stubblefield, 16 Cal. App. 3d 820, 94 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1971); Safransky v. State
Personnel Bd., 62 Wis. 2d 464, 215 N.W.2d 379 (1974).
78. See cases cited in note 77 supra. For further discussion of the factor analysis, see
generally Comment, Unfitness to Teach: Credential Revocation and Dismissal for Sexual
Conduct, 61 CALiF. L. REV. 1442 (1973).
79. See Board of Educ. v. Jack M., 19 Cal. 3d at 698 n.3, 566 P.2d at 605 n.3, 139 Cal.
Rptr. at 703 n.3.
80. See Sexual Conduct as Ground for Dismissal of Teacher or Denial or Revocation
of Teaching Certificate, Annot., 78 A.L.R.3d 19, § 2[a] (1977).
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interest case parallels that in a liberty interest case. A blanket pol-
icy of adverse action based solely on homosexual status will not
supply the nexus and, in fact, raises constitutional issues of First
Amendment magnitude."" Homosexual conduct may provide an ad-
equate nexus to support adverse action only if the conduct impacts
upon job performance, service efficiency or other criteria utilized in
the external source to define the scope of the protected property
right.82 As Norton intimated, the assertion of a property interest
alone will result in judicial application of a nexus requirement sim-
ilar in scope to the rational basis test utilized in contexts other
than public personnel law.83 However, property interests are often
asserted in conjunction with other protected interests in homosex-
ual public employee cases. In this regard, when a fundamental or
core right secured by the Constitution is coupled with a contrac-
tual property interest, the nexus test may approach the compelling
state interest test.8 The assertion of a property interest in that
context then becomes significant from the standpoint of remedies.
Burton v. Cascade School District Union High School No. 585 is an
example of the importance that such an assertion of property
rights assumes.
Burton involved the dismissal of a non-tenured high school
teacher for homosexuality. The mother of a high school student
81. This was recognized in Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 853 (D. Md.
1973), afl'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836
(1974): "The Board of Education's policy of not knowingly employing any homosexuals is
objectionable." Id. at 853.
82. See, e.g., Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d at 229, 461 P.2d at 386, 82 Cal.
Rptr. at 186; Safransky v. State Personnel Bd., 62 Wis. 2d at 474, 215 N.W. 2d at 384.
83. E.g., Safransky v. State Personnel Bd., 62 Wis. 2d 464, 215 N.W.2d 379 (1974).
"Courts of other jurisdictions have required ... a showing of a sufficient rational connection
or nexus between the conduct complained of and the performance of the duties of employ-
ment." Id. at 474, 215 N.W.2d at 384 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
84. In a case involving a teacher's sexual conduct of a non-homosexual nature, rights
of privacy and association were asserted in conjunction with the contractual property right.
Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972), af'd, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973). The
district court in ordering reinstatement stated: "Similarly, to justify a dampening of the
rights of assembly or association and privacy the state in the present case must show that
the termination of the teacher's contract was caused by conduct which 'materially and sub-
stantially' interfered with. the school's work or rights of students, and 'undifferentiated fear
or apprehension' of such interference is not enough. In the present case the state has failed
to show any actual interference by Mrs. Fisher's conduct with any interest of the state in its
educational endeavors." 346 F. Supp. at 401 (emphasis added).
85. 353 F. Supp. 254 (D. Or. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975).
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informed the principal that Burton was a homosexual. The case
involved no allegations of homosexual advances toward students or
dereliction of duties. The school board, after Burton acknowledged
that she was a practicing homosexual, terminated her contract pur-
suant to an Oregon statute which permitted dismissal of a teacher
during a contract period for "immorality."86 The court found that
the statute was unconstitutionally vague as it failed to provide ad-
equate warning of prohibited conduct.87 In a footnote, the district
court noted that the Oregon statute posed a serious constitutional
problem because it failed to require a nexus between the em-
ployee's conduct and teaching performance."
Burton appealed the district court's denial of her request for
reinstatement. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
substantive findings of the district court and discussed at length
the impact of a property right on the remedy of reinstatement. 9
[Burton] was granted full pay for the loss resulting from the
wrongful termination of her one-year contract. And although the
parties have stipulated that Ms. Burton was an "adequate
teacher," we cannot say that her chances of reemployment were
such as to warrant our finding the same type of "property inter-
est" in reemployment which might require reinstatement of a ten-
ured teacher, or one under longer-term contract with the district.
We hold only that, given the speculative nature of any expecta-
tion of reemployment appellant may have had, the district judge's
award of an additional year's salary (above and beyond the
backpay award for the unserved portion of her original contract)
seems generous, and well within the lower bounds of his remedial
discretion.9"
Thus, the homosexual's assertion of a property interest in a
section 1983 case may reflect deprivation of a constitutionally pro-
tected right subject to remedy. Or, assertion of this interest in con-
junction with a liberty interest may provide the basis for seeking
remedial recourse in the nature of reinstatement. Property and lib-
erty interests have been merged even beyond this remedial inter-
section by judicial interpretation of the interest an individual has
in his character and reputation.
86. 353 F. Supp. at 254.
87. Id. at 255.
88. Id. at n.1.
89. 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1975).
90. Id. at 853.
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B. Stigma and Reputation
The Supreme Court's analysis of procedural due process pre-
requisites to adverse action by state officials in Wisconsin v. Con-
stantineau9' intimated the existence of, at the very least, a fringe
liberty interest in one's reputation, honor and integrity.9 2 Through
years of litigation, the Supreme Court has circumscribed this con-
cept of a substantive property interest in reputation so narrowly
that only a small class of litigants can assert a valid action for gov-
ernment conduct that effectively stigmatizes them. The Court's
suggestion in Board of Regents v. Roth,9" that adverse employment
action could impact upon either of two constitutionally protected
interests-reputation or the ability to practice one's chosen profes-
sion-merged in Paul v. Davis."
The words "liberty" and "property" as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment do not in terms single out reputation as a candidate
for special protection over and above other interests that may be
protected by state law. While we have in a number of our prior
cases pointed out the frequently drastic effect of the "stigma"
which may result from defamation by the government in a variety
of contexts, this line of cases does not establish the proposition
that reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests
such as employment, is either "liberty" or "property" by itself
sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process
Clause.... 95
The ultimate effect of Paul's requirement that an interest in
addition to that of reputation be adversely affected is to limit the
use of the stigma doctrine to public personnel cases involving ten-
ured individuals. Adverse employment action against a public em-
ployee without tenure and its attendent property interest obvi-
91. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
92. "[W]here the State attaches 'a badge of infamy' to the citizen, due process comes
into play.... '[T]he right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any
kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a
principle basic to our society.'...
"Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.
'Posting' under the Wisconsin Act may to some be merely the mark of illness, to others it is
a stigma, an official branding of a person. The label is a degrading one.... Only when the
whole proceedings leading to the pinning of an unsavory label on a person are aired can
oppressive results be prevented." Id. at 437 (citations omitted).
93. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
94. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
95. Id. at 701.
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ously imposes no change in the individual's status. The fact that
he loses a specific job or is denied that job does not automatically
foreclose his ability to practice his chosen profession. Only in the
most egregious and unusual instance will dismissal or failure to
hire have this result.98 The tenured employee, on the other hand,
loses his job, his status as a tenured individual, and possibly the
right to another position with the government (along with the wide
range of benefits that inure to the public employee) when he is
dismissed. Thus, judicial application and construction of the
stigma concept, which had its roots in liberty, has transformed it
into a hybrid of property and liberty interests in the context of
public personnel actions.
In addition to the Paul requirement, which places the burden
of proof on the plaintiff, the plaintiff must allege and prove that
the label or allegation leading to the adverse action is false,97 and
that public dissemination has taken place." These requirements
are particulary anomalous in the context of litigation by the homo-
sexual employee. First, it is often the fact of notoriety which pro-
vides the vital link justifying the agency's decision for adverse ac-
tion to promote service efficiency. Second, the homosexual litigant
cannot, in good faith, assert falsity. Yet, the stigma in a homosex-
ual employment case does not arise from the label of homosexual-
ity, but rather from the imputation that the individual is incompe-
tent, or is incapable of satisfactory job peformance, or is promoting
agency inefficiency simply because he is homosexual. It is not the
litigant's status as a homosexual which is false, but rather it is the
finding of just cause for dismissal based upon the homosexuality.
In assessing what constitutes stigmatizing information, the
courts have chosen to follow precedent rather than to formulate
specific guidelines. The courts have uniformly held that imputa-
tion of criminal or immoral conduct stigmatizes a person.99 An alle-
96. See, e.g., Cato v. Collins, 539 F.2d 656 (8th Cir. 1976); Giordano v. Roudebush, 448
F. Supp. 899 (S.D. Iowa 1977).
97. See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627 (1977).
98. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. at 348-49.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1975); Burdeau v. Trust-
ees of Cal. State Colleges, 507 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1974). These and other cases quote heavily
from Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573, which states: "The State, in declining to
rehire the respondent, did not make any charge against him that might seriously damage his
standing and associations in his community. It did not base the nonrenewal of his contract
on a charge, for example, that he had been guilty of dishonesty, or immorality."
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gation of incompetence is rarely held to be stigmatizing. In Stret-
ten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hospital,100 *a case involving the
dismissal of a pathologist from a residency program, the court
found that an imputation of incompetence was not stigmatizing
since it affected the physician's reputation only within the profes-
sional sphere. More recently, another court in Giordano v.
Roudebush,101 found that allegations of incompetence-whether
they remain within the sphere of one's professional community or
extend to the community at large-may constitute stigmatization
of constitutional dimensions.10 2 Because Dr. Giordano's status was
that of a probationary employee, he was not entitled to reinstate-
ment and, under ordinary circumstances, had no legitimate claim
beyond the right to an agency hearing to clear his name.103 How-
ever, the Veterans Administration's action effectively foreclosed
his ability to secure permanent employment between the dates of
his dismissal and agency hearing; therefore, he was awarded
backpay for that period of time.' "
As in the case of Dr. Giordano, the probationary employee or
the applicant suffers most from the stigmatizing label of incompe-
tence or unfitness; yet, this is the very individual for whom relief is
most often denied. The teaching profession provides an apt exam-
ple of the manner in which these principles operate. A teacher
without tenure rights and the concomitant expectation of contin-
ued employment may be dismissed for private, consensual homo-
sexual acts with an adult. In most states, to attain tenure and a
permanent certificate as a teacher, the individual must teach a cer-
tain number of years at specified grade levels. The refusal of school
boards to hire or to retain the homosexual teacher gives rise to his
inability to find or retain employment. This ultimately forecloses
his ability to gain tenure and to obtain a permanent license to
practice his chosen profession.
To date, the judiciary has failed to recognize this pattern as
the result of branding the non-tenured teacher or other public em-
ployee with a badge of infamy. Yet, this is precisely the form that
racial discrimination took for years as many unions which exer-
100. 537 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1976).
101. 448 F. Supp. 899 (S.D. Iowa 1977).
102. Id. at 906.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 909.
Winter 1981]
274 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
cised actual or de facto control over the construction industry re-
fused to hire blacks who failed to meet their qualifications while
they maintained systems to assure that blacks never attained
proper qualifications for union hiring.105 This pervasive and circui-
tous discrimination may be just as destructive of constitutional
rights and human dignity as overt discrimination in hiring.
The non-tenured employee or applicant has, at best, a mini-
mal chance of securing relief on the basis of stigma. For such indi-
viduals, relief pursuant to section 1983 may be grounded on a find-
ing that due process or equal protection have been violated or that
a "pure" liberty interest such as speech or privacy has been
transgressed.
C. Status/Classification
[A] homosexual is after all a human being, and a citizen of the
United States despite the fact that he finds his sex gratification in
what most consider to be an unconventional manner. He is as
much entitled to the protection and benefits of the laws and due
process fair treatment as are others ' . . .208
Principles of due process and equal protection come into play
when the federal or state government, as employer, seeks to clas-
sify applicants or employees on the basis of homosexual status or
conduct. As previously shown, the nexus requirement protects the
tenured employee in the federal and state sectors by providing the
requisite due process. In recent years, applicants, probationary em-
ployees and other non-tenured individuals have directed argu-
ments toward injecting this nexus requirement into the scheme of
due process protection to which they are entitled.
The Civil Service Commission's blanket policy of disqualifying
all persons who engaged in or solicited others to engage in homo-
sexual acts was attacked by an organization of homosexuals in So-
ciety for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton.1 0 7 The plaintiff had
been discharged for his homosexual status on the Commission's as-
sumption that employment of a homosexual would result in public
105. See, e.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir.
1969).
106. McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809, 814 (D. Minn. 1970), rev'd, 451 F.2d
193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972).
107. 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal. 1973), af'd on other grounds, 528 F.2d 905 (9th Cir.
1975).
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contempt for the agency.108 Plaintiff's homosexual status was re-
vealed through a routine investigation which uncovered his general
discharge from the Army for admitted homosexuality. The court
ordered class relief as follows:
[F]orthwith cease excluding or discharging from government ser-
vice any homosexual person whom the Commission would deem
unfit for government employment solely because the employment
of such a person in the government service might bring that ser-
vice into the type of public contempt which might reduce the gov-
ernment's ability to perform the public business with the essen-
tial respect and confidence of the citizens which it serves .... 109
The court relied heavily on Norton and found that the Com-
mission had the burden of proving that discharge for immoral be-
havior "actually impairs the efficiency of the service."110 Presuma-
bly, the decision was based on due process grounds, since the court
found that the Commission's policy as stated in the Federal Per-
sonnel Manual was faulty for overbreadth.111
In response to this decision, the Commission issued a bulletin
on December 21, 1973, prohibiting those engaged in suitability
evaluations from making a determination of unsuitability based
solely on homosexual status, admission of homosexual acts, or the
determination that employment of such an individual might result
in public contempt for the agency. 12 Effective July 25, 1975, Civil
Service Regulations were amended to reflect the impact of the
opinion in Society for Individual Rights, Inc., and the word "im-
108. 63 F.R.D. at 401.
109. Id. at 402.
110. Id. at 401 (emphasis added).
111. The challenged section read: "Homosexuality and sexual perversion-Persons
about whom there is evidence that they have engaged in or solicited others to engage in
homosexual or sexually perverted acts with them, without evidence of rehabilitation, are not
suitable for public employment. In acting on such cases, the Commission will consider arrest
records, or records of conviction for some form of homosexuality or sexual perversion; or
medical evidence, admissions, or other credible evidence that the individual has engaged in
or solicited 'others to engage in such acts with him. Evidence showing that a person has
homosexual tendencies, standing alone, is insufficient to support a rating of unsuitability on
the grounds of immoral conduct." Id. at 400 n.1.
112. "Accordingly, you may not find a person unsuitable for federal employment
merely because that person is a homosexual or has engaged in homosexual acts, nor may
such exclusion be based on a conclusion that a homosexual person might bring the public
service into public contempt. You are, however, permitted to dismiss a person or find him or
her unsuitable for Federal employment where the evidence establishes that such person's
homosexual conduct affects job fitness-excluding from such consideration, however, unsub-
stantiated conclusions concerning possible embarrassment to the Federal service."
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moral" was deleted from the list of disqualifying reasons.113 The
Suitability Guidelines for Federal Employment regarding the de-
termination of Infamous or Notoriously Disgraceful Conduct was
amended to read:
Individual sexual conduct will be considered under the guides dis-
cussed above. Court decisions require that persons not be disqual-
ified from Federal employment solely on the basis of homosexual
conduct. The Commission and agencies have been enjoined not to
find a person unsuitable for Federal employment solely because
that person is homosexual or has engaged in homosexual acts.
Based upon these court decisions and outstanding injunction,
while the person may not be found unsuitable based on unsub-
stantiated conclusions concerning possible embarassment to the
Federal service, a person may be dismissed or found unsuitable
for Federal employment where the evidence establishes that such
a person's sexual conduct affects job fitness.114
Society for Individual Rights, Inc., raises two important im-
plications regarding overbreadth and due process. First, by finding
that the federal government's regulation was overbroad, Society
for Individual Rights, Inc., implied that the regulation encom-
passed protected rights and activity, as well as unprotected activ-
ity. Society for Individual Rights, Inc., made no attempt to deline-
ate what the core of protection involved was, but it opened the
door to the assertion that federal employment cannot be denied to
individuals who can show that such rights as association, speech
and privacy have been unnecessarily invaded by a prohibition of
employment based on homosexual status or conduct, absent a
nexus between the status or conduct and the individual's job per-
formance or the agency's job efficiency. As in Norton, Society for
Individual Rights, Inc., placed the burden of proof on the govern-
ment.11 5 The second implication is that, even in the absence of reg-
ulations specifying generalized bases for discharge or failure to
hire, due process requires a nexus between status or conduct and
job performance or service efficiency. After Society for Irldividual
Rights, Inc., mere assertion of homosexual status or conduct, ab-
sent proof of an actual impact on job performance or agency effi-
ciency, is so irrational as to be violative of due process.
113. 5 C.F.R. § 731.202(b)(2): "Criminal, dishonest, infamous or notoriously disgrace-
ful conduct" (1980).
114. Federal Personnel Manual Supplement (Letter) 731-3, app. 2, pt. B.3.
115. See 63 F.R.D. at 401.
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In the wake of Societyi for Individual Rights, Inc., the federal
government's regulations now afford applicants and other individu-
als without tenure, as well as those with a valid property interest
in employment, a right to employment free from the unconstitu-
tional condition imposed by irrational classifications. The homo-
sexual litigant's due process argument may be grounded on the
general terms of the statute or regulation, as it was in Society for
Individual Rights, Inc., or it may be grounded on the agency's de-
termination and action. Thus, even where legislation specifies'gen-
eral terms such as "immoral conduct" or "unprofessional conduct"
as a basis for dismissal or non-hiring, and this legislation can be
construed to pass constitutional muster, the court may look behind
the language in the legislation to examine the agency's application
of the standards. This is what occured in Singer v. United States
Civil Service Commission.11'
Singer was a probationary status clerk-typist who challenged
his dismissal on the basis that the agency's determination and ac-
tion was improper and arbitrary or capricious. Citing Toohey v.
Nitze,117 the court summarized the scope of review accorded
agency action as follows:
"Dismissal from federal employment is largely a matter of execu-
tive agency discretion. Particularly is this true during the proba-
tionary period. The scope of judicial review is narrow. Assuming
that statutory procedures meet constitutional requirements, the
court is limited to a determination of whether the agency sub-
stantially complied with its statutory and regulatory procedures,
whether its factual determinations were supported by substantial
evidence, and whether its action was arbitrary, capricious or an
abuse of discretion."118
The court found ample evidence to support the agency's ac-
tion and its finding that Singer's conduct adversely affected service
efficiency because he had flaunted his homosexuality at his prior
place of employment, he identified himself as a government em-
ployee in extensive media coverage and publications regarding a
Gay symposium, and he received extensive media coverage as a re-
sult of his attempt to marry another male. Thus, Singer's open and
notorious homosexual conduct, coupled with his public display of
116. 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977).
117. 429 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1970).
118. 530 F.2d at 251 (footnote omitted).
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such conduct and his advocacy of homosexual conduct while iden-
tifying himself as a federal employee provided a rational nexus for
the agency's action.119
The federal judiciary's conclusion that Fifth Amendment due
process requires a nexus between homosexual status or conduct
and job performance or service efficiency permits employees to
seek relief on two bases. The first, applicable to many tenured em-
ployees, is that external sources defining their employment rights
violate due process by failing to require the appropriate nexus.
Such arguments may be grounded on vagueness or overbreadth.1 2 0
The second basis, primarily useful to probationers and applicants,
is a direct due process attack on employer or agency action. The
argument posited is that failure to hire or dismissal based solely on
homosexual status or conduct is arbitrary or capricious. 21
In the federal sector, then, a statute or regulation which car-
ries a blanket prohibition on employment of homosexuals will nor-
mally fall due to its overbreadth. Similarly, where regulations do
not expressly prohibit employment of homosexuals, but an agency
interprets regulations or policy permitting adverse employment ac-
tion on general bases, such as immorality, to permit or require ad-
verse action solely on the basis of homosexual status or conduct,
there is a due process violation.
Judicial construction of similar public personnel issues in the
state sector parallels this federal sector analysis of due process. As
previously noted in the context of property rights, the state stat-
utes or regulations are subject to due process attack for failure to
require a nexus between homosexual status or conduct and job
performance. 22 When faced with a due process attack on a regula-
tion governing dismissal of tenured employees or those with some
type of contract, the court may take either of two courses of action.
In Morrison, the court implied a nexus requirement in the regula-
tion to supply the necessary specificity encompassing only unpro-
tected activity, thus construing the regulation in a manner conso-
119. Id. at 255.
120. See, e.g., Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
121. See, e.g., Society for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal.
1973).
122. See, e.g., Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 5, 353 F. Supp
254 (D. Or. 1973).
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nant with Fourteenth Amendment due process. 12 3 In contrast, the
court in Burton held the statute invalid because its terminology
failed to require a nexus which, in effect, would have provided the
necessary specificity while prohibiting an overly broad application
of'the statute.124
A due process attack aimed at an agency's decision may char-
acterize that decision as arbitrary or capricious for one of the
three reasons discussed by the First Circuit in Drown v. Ports-
mouth School District.25 In egregious cases, the reason supporting
dismissal may be trivial; or the school board's (or agency's) actions
may be wholly unsupported by the facts; or the reason for dismis-
sal may be "unrelated to the educational process [job assignment]
or to working relationships within the educational institution" or
agency. 126 Clearly, the Drown decision's first two facets employ a
traditional substantive due process analysis, and the third facet
entails the same rational nexus concept which is evident in federal
sector cases.
Thus, when a state employee demonstrates that a regulation
on its face or in its application lacks specificity, or has such a
broad reach that it encompasses protected conduct, or has no safe-
guards against arbitrary or capricious decisions, the litigant can
prevail.1 27 At this point, the burden of proof shifts to the em-
ployer-agency to prove that a rational nexus exists between the
agency's efficiency or employee's performance and the employee's
or applicant's conduct or status.1 28 Again, factors such as notoriety,
criminality, impairment of working relationships important to the
job function, or actual embarrassment affecting service efficiency
may provide the requisite nexus.129 If the employee prevails, he
may be afforded relief in the nature of reinstatement if he is a ten-
ured employee.130 The individual who is not tenured may be af-
123. 1 Cal. 3d at 233 n.36, 461 P.2d at 389 n.36, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 189 n.36.
124. 353 F. Supp. at 255.
125. 451 F.2d 1106 (1st Cir. 1971).
126. Id. at 1108.
127. E.g., Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 5, 353 F. Supp. 254
(D. Or. 1973).
128. E.g., Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d at 1167; Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d
at 235, 461 P.2d at 391-92, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
129. See notes 77 & 78 supra.
130. E.g., Board of Educ. v. Jack M., 19 Cal. 3d 691, 566 P.2d 602, 139 Cal. Rptr. 700
(1977).
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forded backpay and/or damages for breach of contract, but he will
rarely, if ever, be reinstated. 13 1
If the employee or applicant does not have employment or
tenure rights defined by statute, regulation or contract, he may
still assert that employer-agency action was arbitrary or capricious,
thus violating the constitutional standard of due process, in a lim-
ited class of cases. The employee-applicant should attempt to
demonstrate that the employer-agency dismissed him or refused to
hire him without considering the individual facts of his case, acting
instead pursuant to a policy of excluding all individuals who have
homosexual propensities, or who identify with homosexuals or en-
gage in any type of homosexual conduct. The courts have rather
uniformly recognized such blanket exclusions as violative of due
process.
13 2
131. See discussion in Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 5, 512
F.2d at 852-54. In his dissent, Circuit Judge Lumbard makes a persuasive case for reinstate-
ment of all individuals dismissed for constitutionally infirm reasons. Id. at 854-56.
132. Whenever possible, state courts have declined to rule definitively on this issue.
See, e.g., Aumiller v. University of Del., 434 F. Supp. 1273, 1292 n.56 (D. Del. 1977): "The
question of whether a homosexual professor employed at a university constitutionally can be
dismissed or his contract nonrenewed solely because he is a homosexual has not been ad-
dressed specifically." See also Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 5, 512
F.2d at 854 n.5: "We do not address the question whether the school district could refuse to
rehire appellant, or whether any other school system could refuse to give her a teaching
position,, solely on the basis of her homosexual inclinations." Safransky v. State Personnel
Bd., 62 Wis. 2d at 1475, 215 N.W.2d at 385: "Likewise, the question of whether an individ-
ual may be terminated solely for his homosexual status is not an issue and need not be
determined."
But, state courts have indicated constitutional infirmity with blanket exclusions in
dicta. Cf. McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970), rev'd, 451 F.2d 193
(8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972), where the district court stated that:
"[though by current standards many persons characterize an homosexual as engaging in
'immoral conduct,' 'indecent' and 'disgraceful,' it seems clear that to justify dismissal from
public employment, or as the court finds in this case to reject an applicant for public em-
ployment, it must be shown that there is an observable and reasonable relationship between
efficiency in the job and homosexuality." 316 F. Supp. at 814.
The court of appeals, on the other hand, found "it is at once apparent that this is not a
case involving mere homosexual propensities on the part of a prospective employee. Neither
is it a case in which an applicant is excluded from employment because of a desire
clandestinely to pursue homosexual conduct." 451 F.2d at 196.
See also Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, where the district court as-
serted: "[M]ere knowledge that a teacher is homosexual is not sufficient to justify transfer or
dismissal." Id. at 856. But the court of appeals annoamced: "We hold, therefore, that
Acanfora's public statements were protected by the first amendment and that they do not




The assertion of due process violations based on homosexual
status or conduct, where the state or federal government seeks to
directly or indirectly classify individuals according to such criteria,
is normally accompanied by the assertion of an equal protection
violation. Utilizing section 1983, the applicant or non-tenured em-
ployee, as well as those with tenure, can validly assert an equal
protection violation based on governmental statute, regulation or
policy, s for adverse employment actions based on homosexual
status or conduct. The court will judge the agency's action by one
of two standards. If the litigant can establish that the classification
on the basis of sexual preference in persuasion or conduct impinges
a basic fundamental right is necessarily directed at a suspect
group, the judiciary will strictly scrutinize the classification to de-
termine whether the means utilized by the state actually further a
compelling state interest with the least impact or intrusion on the
fundamental right or the suspect group.1 4 If the litigant is unable
to prove that, as a homosexual, he is a member of a suspect group
or that a fundamental right is involved, the court, employing the
traditional standard of equal protection, will inquire only "[i]f the
goals sought are legitimate, and the classification adopted is ra-
tionally related to the achievement of those goals."13 5
To fully understand the impact of equal protection on homo-
sexual public employee cases, it is necessary to examine factors
comprising suspect and non-suspect classifications, the homosex-
ual's interest in public employment, the state interests that sup-
port classification based on homosexual status or conduct, and the
constitutional rights which are or may be infringed by such a clas-
sification. Although the Supreme Court has not addressed classifi-
cations based on homosexuality in the context of employment, an
argument can be advanced for treating classifications based on ho-
mosexual status or conduct as "suspect," or at least as "semi-sus-
pect," meriting a heightened judicial scrutiny, which requires that:
"A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial rela-
133. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 173 (1970).
134. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). The district court in Acanfora v. Board of
Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), held that adult, private, consensual homosexual acts
are protected. Id. at 852.
135. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 84 (1971) (emphasis added). See also Forum:
Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2 HASTNGS CONST. L.Q. 645, 669-71 (1975).
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tion to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike.' ,,'u
In Frontiero v. Richardson,1 3 7 the Supreme Court discussed its
rationale for finding sex to be a semi-suspect classification.
[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable charac-
teristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition
of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex be-
cause of their sex would seem to violate "the basic concept of our
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to indi-
vidual responsibility .... " And what differentiates sex from
such non-suspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability,
and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria is that the sex
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or
contribute to society.lss
This reasoning is arguably applicable to classifications based on
sexual preference." 9
In addition, the groups which the Court has treated as suspect
or semi-suspect classes have traditionally been the subject of pri-
vate and governmental discrimination which has burdened them in
such contexts as employment, education and legal status to con-
tract.1 40 Legislative classifications were often the result of stereo-
typed myths and/or attributes beyond the control of these
individuals. 4
In the Western world, homosexuals have been subjected to
pervasive discrimination since Biblical times.1 42 Until the 1960's,
homosexuals could be denied federal employment solely on the ba-
136. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,76 (1971); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
This equal protection test, applied in sex discrimination cases, requires that the classifica-
tion bear a substantial relationship to an important government interest. 404 U.S. at 76; 429
U.S. at 197. By comparison, the test applied in suspect class situations requires that a com-
pelling state interest be shown. See note 134 supra.
137. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
138. Id. at 686. See also Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 507 F.2d 611
(5th Cir. 1975).
139. The court has yet to find discrimination based on sexual preference violative of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Enslin v. Bean, 565 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 912 (1978); Doe v. Commonwealth's Atty., 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va.
1975), af'd mem. 425 U.S. 901 (1976); Wainwright v. Stone, 478 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.), reu'd
per curiam, 414 U.S. 21 (1973).
140. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
141. See Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573, 576 (1973).
142. Id. at 576-77.
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sis of that status.143 Some states still maintain a policy of tacitly
disapproving of employing homosexuals in such socially sensitive
occupations as teaching, although other reasons may be offered as
justification.14 4 The myths surrounding homosexuals are legion and
seriously detrimental to homosexual rights in employment. For ex-
ample, they are considered by many to be pedophiles, thus posing
a substantial threat to society. Yet, statistics clearly refute this and
demonstrate, instead, that pedophiles are more likely to be
heterosexuals. 14 5
The medical profession has reached a consensus that homo-
sexuality is not per se a psychological disorder, but no consensus
exists as to the ability of an individual to control his homosexual-
ity.1' Divergent theories cite singular or composite causative fac-
tors of a biological, hormonal, environmental and psychological na-
ture.1 47 In the final analysis, the most certain fact is that too little
is known to determine actual causation and to predict its relation-
ship to an individual's ability to control his sexual preference. It is
evident from recent studies that homosexuality cannot be "cured"
in the vast majority of cases. 48 Thus, although the adult may
choose to engage in homosexual conduct, it may be inferred that
he does not choose his sexual preference.
Although the courts could reasonably conclude that classifica-
tions based on sexual preference are not suspect, the importance of
the ability to practice one's profession and to obtain public sector
employment may tip the balance of the scales in favor of at least
heightened scrutiny of such classifications. This would parallel the
type of analysis which has been utilized in sex discrimination
cases.
The rejection of the right-privilege doctrine generated re-
143. E.g., Society for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal.
1973).
144. See Note, Homosexuals in the Teaching Profession, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 125
(1971).
145. Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution, Report, 45-46 (Am. ed.
1963) [hereinafter cited as Wolfenden Report]. See also Dr. Irving Bieber's comments in
Playboy Panel: Homosexuality, PLAYBOY, Apr. 1971, at 88.
146. See L BIEBER, HoMosExuALITy: A PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY (1962); A. KARLEN, SEX-
UALITY AND HoMosExuALrry (1971); Wolfenden Report, supra note 145.
147. For contrasting viewpoints see C. SOCAMDES, THE OVERT HOMOSEXUAL 22 (1968);
SEXUAL INVERSION: THE MULTIPLE RooTs oi HOMOSEXUALITY (J. Marmor ed. 1965); A Letter
from Freud, 107 Am. J. PsYcH. 786 (1951).
148. See L BIRER, supra note 146, at 310-19; A. KARLEN, supra note 146, at 572-606.
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newed interest in public employment as the Supreme Court stated
that employment in the public sector cannot be subjected to un-
constitutional conditions.149 In the absence of an actual, vested
property right to public employment, there remains the fundamen-
tal and constitutionally protected right to pursue a chosen occupa-
tion150 and the liberty interest in pursuing government employ-
ment based on valid eligibility requirements. 151 "The Constitution
does not distinguish between applicants and employees; both are
entitled, like other people, to equal protection against arbitrary or
discriminatory treatment by the Government."
1 52
As a practical matter, the effect of disqualifying from public
employment all individuals who have engaged in homosexual con-
duct would be to eliminate virtually 37% of the caucasian male
population.153 Simply excluding those individuals who are exclu-
sively homosexual in orientation would eliminate upwards of three
to four million Americans.'" The reasons advanced for excluding
this vast number of homosexuals from public employment include
or may include the following: (1) homosexuals are subject to black-
mail and may, therefore, compromise their job performance, ser-
vice efficiency, or security; (2) homosexual conduct is criminalized
in most states, and public policy does not favor employment of
criminals; (3) homosexual conduct is immoral, unprofessional, or
denotes acts involving moral turpitude, and public policy opposes
employment of individuals who manifest such traits; (4) employ-
ment of homosexuals will result in the public's losing respect and
confidence in the agency; (5) employment of homosexuals denotes
tacit approval of homosexual conduct, and this is contrary to pub-
lic policy as a frustration of the criminal statutes; (6) employment
of homosexuals in the public sector, by denoting tacit approval of
homosexual conduct, will increase the prevalence of such conduct;
(7) homosexual status or conduct denotes a psychological disorder
or imbalance; (8) employment of homosexuals will disrupt working
149. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
150. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
151. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
152. Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
153. See A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE
650-51 (1948) [hereinafter cited as KmsEY REPORT].
154. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE
ON HOMO.SEXUALIY 4 (1969).
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relationships by fostering homosexual affairs between co-workers
or by creating resentment in heterosexual co-workers who are solic-
ited by homosexuals. It is apparent from an examination of these
concerns that all of them can be addressed without imposing a
blanket prohibition on employment of homosexuals. In fact, a
closer examination indicates that some of these objectives may not
be legitimate.
The first objective is advanced in cases involving the federal
government's security clearance program.155 Even in the context of
national security, the courts have recognized that the potential for
blackmail does not justify blanket denial of security clearances
(the ultimate effect of which may be dismissal from an agency or
specific position) except in such limited contexts as CIA employ-
ment. Denial of a security clearance, whether an industrial or fed-
eral clearance, must be supported by a rational nexus linking the
applicant's homosexuality to an inability to maintain national
secrets.15 For example, an individual who fears revelation of his
homosexuality is, in fact, a candidate for blackmail. He can validly
be denied a security clearance. 157 An individual who has no such
fears and does not seek to hide his homosexuality is not subject to
blackmail. Therefore, he cannot be denied a security clearance
solely on the assumption that homosexuality renders him subject
to blackmail. 58
Objectives relevant to criminal statutes often fail to recognize
three important practical matters. First, state laws penalize "ho-
mosexual" conduct between heterosexual, as well as homosexual,
couples; yet, how many agencies inquire into the private sexual
conduct of professed heterosexuals? From a legal standpoint, is
their conduct any less criminal or reprehensible? Second, not all
forms of homosexual conduct are criminal, as the court in Morri-
son aptly noted.159 Third, statistics indicate there is, at best, a
minimal and arbitrary enforcement of such laws. °10 Legally, the
155. See, e.g., Gayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1973), amended concur-
ring opinion, 494 F.2d 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
156. See Gayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
157. E.g., McKeand v. Laird, 490 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1973).
158. See note 155 and accompanying text supra.
159. 1 Cal. 3d at 218-19 n.4, 461 P.2d at 370 n.4, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 177-78 n.4.
160. See Project, The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical
Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 643
(1966).
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constitutionality of laws regulating private, consensual sexual con-
duct between adults is dubious in light of the Supreme Court's rec-
ognition that a sphere of privacy surrounds the individual.161
Clearly, the objectives relevant to state criminal statutes may be
met by prohibiting employment of only those individuals who have
criminal records for engaging in homosexual conduct for those jobs
in which criminal conduct of this nature is demonstrably relevant
to job performance.
As the Morrison Court recognized, morality is hardly a subject
upon which consensus is possible. Although society's interest in
promoting established norms of behavior must be accorded some
weight, total deference to social norms is inconsistent with the con-
cept of individual freedom and may impede the growth of both
society and the individual.162 A far more relevant standard for em-
ployment lies in the examination of the individual's conduct or sta-
tus in relationship to the duties he and the agency must fulfill. 63
Norton made it clear, as did Society for Individual Rights, Inc.,
that potential agency embarassment is an insufficient basis for ex-
cluding individuals from employment if they are otherwise
qualified.'6 '
What is probably the strongest fear of the general popu-
lace-that tacit approval of homosexuality will increase its occur-
rence-has been categorically proven groundless.' 5
Perhaps it is the ignorance which surrounds homosexuality
that has, in the past, perpetuated distorted perspectives and per-
mitted the medical profession to view homosexuality as an illness.
As knowledge of the subject has increased, medical perspectives
161. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Schopler, Su-
preme Court's Views as to the Federal Legal Aspects of the Right of Privacy, Annot., 43 L.
Ed. 2d 871 (1975).
162. As District Judge Young stated in Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. at
850-51: "As autonomous and rational beings, individuals are capable of reasoned decisions
in pursuit of chosen goals. Given man's imperfect knowledge, full freedom of thought and
association is imperative for individual self-development and social progress. So long as the
freedoms of others are not affected, a government intended to promote the life, liberty and
happiness of its citizens must abstain from interference with individual pursuits, no matter
how unorthodox or repulsive to the majority."
163. 1 Cal. 3d at 220, 461 P.2d at 379, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
164. 417 F.2d at 1167; see also Society for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 63
F.R.D. at 401.
165. See E. ScHuR, CRas WrrHouT Vicmims 110-11 (1965); Wolfenden Report, supra
note 145, at 47.
[Vol. 8:255
have changed. The psychiatric community does not recognize ho-
mosexuality per se as a disorder. 16 Although some homosexuals
may be emotionally maladjusted, there are clearly many homosex-
uals who are well-adjusted individuals performing excellent tasks
for their employers.17 With legal recognition of these facts, this
state objective appears to have lost its legitimacy.
Finally, disruption of working relationships is a valid and suf-
ficient reason for dismissal, but blanket exclusions do not prevent
this. They cannot guarantee that all homosexuals will be elimi-
nated, nor do they eliminate the problem since heterosexual affairs
may cause equal or greater disruption.168
Blanket employment policies levelled at permitting adverse
action against homosexuals necessarily impact directly or indi-
rectly on constitutional rights such as speech, association, belief
and privacy. This leaves the homosexual faced with three equally
objectionable and untenable choices: forego all public employment;
secure public employment but forego any activities, associations or
speech-including protected activities-which might reveal one's
homosexuality; or "cure" his sexual persuasion to conform to social
norms.
Utilizing even the least stringent equal protection standard, it
is at least arguable that effectuation of the state's objectives previ-
ously delineated cannot pass constitutional muster when balanced
against the effects of blanket exclusions. The federal sector has al-
ready recognized that exclusion of all homosexuals from any public
position or specific positions, other than investigative agencies con-
cerned with national security, would be so irrational as to be con-
stitutionally infirm.169 States confronted with equal protection ar-
guments based on the blanket exclusion of homosexuals in the
absence of proof of homosexual conduct related to job performance
have also found these classifications constitutionally infirm. 170
166. See notes 145-47 supra.
167. See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Morrison v. State Bd. of
Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
168. See Note, Is Governmental Policy Affecting the Employment of Homosexuals Ra-
tional?, 48 N.C.L. Rav. 912, 923 (1970).
169. See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Society for Individual
Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal. 1973), discussed in notes 112-16 and
accompanying text supra.
170. See note 124 supra; contra, Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d
286, 559 P.2d 1340 (1977).
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Some courts addressing adverse employment actions directed at
"practicing homosexuals" or those who have engaged in recent ho-
mosexual conduct have, likewise, held this classification invalid. 71
Thus, the homosexual litigant may effectively challenge the le-
gitimacy of the state's objectives or the irrationality of its classifi-
cations. The latter attack will find the agency particularly vulnera-
ble if its decision is grounded on homosexual conduct in general,
rather "than a thorough assessment of the litigant's particular
conduct.
In addition to attacks on constitutionally infirm standards vio-
lative of equal protection and due process, the homosexual public
employee can assert that adverse employment actions impinge
upon, or are taken in retaliation for, the exercise of such protected
interests as speech, association or privacy.
D. Speech and Association
For at least a quarter-century this court has made clear that even
though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental bene-
fit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for
any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the
government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person
on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected inter-
ests--specially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the gov-
ernment could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitu-
tionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those
freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would
allow the government to "produce a result which [it] could not
command directly." Such interference with constitutional rights
is impermissible. 72
The unique aspect of public employment, which assumes a
paramount role in First Amendment cases, is the dual role of both
the employer and employee.7 8 Where the state or federal govern-
ment, in its role as sovereign, restrains First Amendment rights of
its employee, in his role as a citizen, the government's actions are
strictly scrutinized to determine whether a compelling governmen-
tal interest is furthered by restrictions of time, place and man-
171. E.g., Board of Educ. v. Jack M., 19 Cal. 3d 691, 566 P.2d 602, 139 Cal. Rptr. 700
(1977).
172. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 597.
173. See Note, The First Amendment and Public Employees: Times Marches On, 57
GEO. L.J. 134 (1968).
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ner.17 4 When the government's actions as employer infringe upon
First Amendment rights of employees, a different set of objectives
underlie the governmental action and, accordingly, the judiciary
will measure the government's action against a different
standard. 17 5
The Supreme Court, in Pickering v. Board of Education,7 6 di-
rected attention to the duality inherent in the public employment
context.
[I]t cannot be gainsaid that the state has interests as an employer
in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly
from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the
speech of the citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to
arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citi-
zen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the inter-
est of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees. 77
The government, as employer, can impose reasonable regula-
tions on the exercise of the First Amendment rights of its employ-
ees which it may not impose on citizens in general. For example,
while the citizenry in general may not be restricted in its exercise
of partisan political activity, the public employee may constitu-
tionally be prohibited from engaging in partisan political activities
as a condition of continued or initial public employment under the
Hatch Act 78 or a state equivalent.179 Thus, a crucial determination
in public employment cases where the homosexual litigant raises
First Amendment issues is the role which the courts attribute to
the employer and/or the employee.
In Perry, the Supreme Court held that a public employee
without tenure or other protected status may raise First Amend-
ment issues:
[T]hus, the respondent's lack of a contractual or tenure "right" to
reemployment for the 1969-1970 academic year is immaterial to
his free speech claim. Indeed, twice before, this Court has specifi-
174. E.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
175. See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v.
Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1977).
176. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
177. Id. at 568.
178. 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1980). See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n
of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
179. See generally Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
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cally held that the nonrenewal of a nontenured public school
teacher's one-year contract may not be predicated on his exercise
of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.180
Thus, in contrast to cases grounded on property interests, an em-
ployee's status in liberty interest cases is irrelevant to a determina-
tion on the merits. It will, however, impact on the issue of appro-
priate remedies. 81
The homosexual litigant may contend that the terms of public
employment as stated or as applied contain unconstitutional con-
ditions that infringe upon or "chill" the exercise of First Amend-
ment freedoms. Or, he may contend that he was subjected to ad-
verse employment action in retaliation for exercising his First
Amendment rights. In making a determination on the merits, the
court will examine the role of the agency or employee, whether the
activity is protected, and whether the agency's regulation ration-
ally furthers a legitimate goal. In balancing the respective interests
of the agency and the employee or applicant, the courts require a
progressively lesser showing of governmental interest as the em-
ployee's activity progressively attenuates from pure speech toward
pure conduct. 8 2
In Pickering, the Supreme Court established the basic frame-
work for an analysis of public employees' right to freedom of
speech. Public criticism of the school board's allocation of funds
and failure to adequately inform the citizenry of financial matters
formed the basis for Pickering's dismissal. The Supreme Court
found that the employee's public statements concerned matters of
public concern, were made by the employee in the context of his
role as a concerned citizen, and did not impede the employee's per-
formance of duties or hamper the school's performance of its func-
tions.183 The Court concluded:
[1]n a case such as the present one, in which the fact of employ-
ment is only tangentially and insubstantially involved in the sub-
ject matter of the public communication made by a teacher,...
it is necessary to regard the teacher as the member of the general
public he seeks to be.'"
180. 408 U.S. at 597-98.
181. See note 44 supra.
182. See Note, Symbolic Speech, 43 FORDHAm L. REV. 590, 592-93 (1975).
183. 391 U.S. at 572-73.
184. Id. at 574.
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The standard by which Pickering's speech was judged was that
spawned by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan:185 "In sum, we hold
that, in a case such as this, abs ent proof of false statements know-
ingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher's exercise of his right to
speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for
his dismissal from public employment. '" 186
In a series of footnotes, the Court further defined the parame-
ters of First Amendment rights in dismissal actions.187 From these,
it is apparent that dismissal or other adverse employment action is
permissible if the speech either exceeds the scope of First Amend-
ment protection in New York Times, is otherwise unprotected, or
shows the employee is unfit to perform assigned duties.188
McConnell v. Anderson8" is one of the first homosexual public
employee cases to follow Pickering. In 1970, McConnell was se-
lected to head the cataloging division at the St. Paul campus li-
brary of the University of Minnesota. The Board of Regents disap-
proved the appointment when McConnell's application for a
marriage license to marry another man drew substantial publicity.
McConnell filed suit under section 1983, contending that the uni-
versity's action deprived him of due process, equal protection and,
collaterally, the freedom of speech and expression. The district
court granted an injunction. 90 It found that McConnell could not
require the university to show cause given the absence of tenure
rights or an employment contract. The court also noted that there
were no university rules governing employment of homosexuals,
that no information of a classified nature was involved in McCon-
nell's position, that by virtue of his public admission of homosexu-
ality, McConnell was not subject to blackmail and thatthe univer-
sity did not allege that McConnell's competency as a librarian or
performance of his duties would be adversely affected by homosex-
ual tendencies. Further, there was no allegation that McConnell
had engaged in sodomy or other homosexual activity proscribed by
state criminal statutes. The court, therefore, based its determina-
185. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
186. 391 U.S. at 574-75.
187. Id. at 570 n.3, 572 n.4, 573 n.5.
188. See Note, supra note 173.
189. 316 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970), rev'd 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1046 (1972).
190. 316 F. Supp. at 815.
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tion on due process considerations.191 The district court declined to
determine whether McConnell's application for a marriage license
constituted symbolic speech and whether the resultant termination
of his employment thus constituted a denial of free expression
under the First Amendment.292
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, noting that Mc-
Connell did not press his First Amendment claims. 93 In a foot-
note, the Eighth Circuit opined that McConnell's conduct in at-
tempting to marry a male fell outside the bounds of symbolic
speech protected in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent SchoolDistrict.'"
Approximately two years after McConnell, another homosex-
ual litigant brought an action under section 1983 to enjoin an ad-
verse employment action infringing upon his freedom of speech. In
Acanfora v. Board of Education,9 5 a junior high school teacher
contested his transfer from the classroom to a non-teaching posi-
tion upon the school board's discovery of his homosexuality.
Acanfora's problems stemmed from two incidents at Pennsylvania
State University where, as a member and treasurer of the
Homophiles, Acanfora was a named plaintiff in a legal action to
compel campus recognition of the homosexual organization. During
a press interview on this subject, Acanfora publicly acknowledged
his homosexuality. Acanfora was suspended during his student
teaching assignment for membership in the Homophiles, but he
was reinstated and satisfactorily completed the assignment after
initiating legal action. His certification to teach in Pennsylvania
was pending review by the Secretary of Education after a six mem-
ber panel split on the issue of good moral character.
To prevent further interference with his teaching career,
Acanfora intentionally failed to disclose his homosexuality and
participation in Homophiles during interviews and on official job
applications. Acanfora was awarded a one year contract by the
Montgomery Board of Education to teach Earth Sciences. After a
month of satisfactory performance, Acanfora was transferred to a
191. Id. at 812, 815.
192. Id. at 815.
193. 451 F.2d at 196 n.7.
194. Id. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
195. 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
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non-teaching position pending investigation. This move was pre-
cipitated by news reports in the New York Times and Washington
Post which discussed a news conference by the Pennsylvania Sec-
retary of Education to announce his decision to grant Acanfora's
certificate to teach in that state.
Acanfora's transfer prompted reinstatement petitions from
students and faculty members and inquiries from media represent-
atives of local and national television, radio shows and newspapers.
Acanfora accepted these offers to appear and discuss the circum-
stances of his lawsuit and the difficulties homosexuals encounter.
Additionally, Acanfora became a member and delegate of the Na-
tional Education Association's gay caucus and attended meetings
of the Washington Gay Activists Alliance.
The district court analyzed Acanfora's contentions of constitu-
tional deprivation in terms of privacy, equal protection, due pro-
cess and the rights of association and speech. After finding a pro-
tectable interest in private, consensual adult homosexuality, the
court found a correlative First Amendment right to "public speech,
organization and assembly in support of that goal by ordinary citi-
zens." 196 The district court characterized promotion of legal rights
for homosexuals as political activity encompassed within the First
Amendment. 97
As with other fundamental interests, the court recognized that
this right was not absolute: "Indeed, freedom of speech is subject
to reasonable regulation as to time, manner and place; and speech
which is 'inseparable' from action does not enjoy the same degree
of protectability. 19
The problem confronting the district court was two-fold. First,
there was a need to define the parameters of First Amendment
protected activity as related to Acanfora's speech and association.
Second, assuming a finding of protected activity, there was a need
to balance the interests of Acanfora against those of the school
board to determine whether the transfer was a reasonable em-
ployer regulation of otherwise protected activity. The district court
treated Acanfora's pre-transfer associations and publicity as pro-
196. 359 F. Supp. at 854.
197. Id. at 856.
198. Id. at 855.
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tected activity.19 The court determined that Acanfora had, as a
citizen, protectable interests in public speech, organization and as-
sembly in support of socio-political goals of homosexuals. 00 But, as
an employee in a special position of trust, Acanfora had a concomi-
tant duty to maintain a degree of privacy in the conduct of his
private life.201 Acanfora also had a personal right to defend the at-
tack on his reputation or fitness to teach which transfer from the
classroom necessarily implied.02 In contrast, the Board of Educa-
tion had "an interest in the regulation of activity detrimental to
the educational process ' '208 and could, therefore, impose reasonable
regulations on the time, place and manner of exercising First
Amendment rights.2°
Acanfora's post-transfer activity was held to be unprotected
because the time, place and manner of occurrence exceeded the
bounds of propriety and necessity and adversely affected the edu-
cational process.20 5 The standard under which the court made this
determination was "whether the speech is likely to incite or pro-
duce imminent effects deleterious to the educational process. "206
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court on different grounds.0 7 The court specifically re-
jected the standard formulated by the district court and held that
Acanfora's public statements were protected under the doctrine
enunciated in Pickering.
[T]he Court has ruled that a teacher's comments on public issues
concerning schools that are neither knowingly false nor made in
reckless disregard of the truth afford no ground for dismissal
199. Id. at 854.
200. Id. at 854, 856.
201. Id. at 855.
202. Id. at 857.
203. Id. at 855.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 857.
206. Id. at 856.
207. 491 F.2d 498, 499 (4th Cir. 1974). The court denied relief on the basis that
Acanfora certified the accuracy of his job application with full knowledge of the significant
omission of his participation in the Homophiles as an extra-curricular activity. "This inten-
tional withholding of facts about his affiliation with the Homophiles is inextricably linked to
his attack on the constitutionality of the school system's refusal to employ homosexuals as
teachers. Acanfora purposely misled the school officials so he could circumvent, not chal-
lenge, what he considered to be their unconstitutional employment practices. He cannot
now invoke the process of the court to obtain a ruling on an issue that he practiced decep-
tion to avoid." Id. at 504.
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when they do not impair the teacher's performance of his duties
or interfere with the operation of the schools. . . Acanfora's
public statements must be judged by these constitutional princi-
ples, and not, as the district court suggested, by the common law
doctrine of self-defense to defamation.
...There is no evidence that the interviews disrupted the
school, substantially impaired his capacity as a teacher, or gave
the school officials reasonable grounds to forecast that these re-
sults would flow from what he said. We hold, therefore, that
Acanfora's public statements were protected by the first amend-
ment and that they do not justify either the action taken by the
school system or the dismissal of his suit. 08
Another case involving the manner and place of exercising
First Amendment rights is Safransky v. State Personnel Board.20 9
A tenured employee was dismissed for cause from his position as
counselor to adolescent boys in a mental institution. The employee
was a self-avowed homosexual who engaged in discussions of his
homosexual lifestyle and practices in the presence of co-workers
and patients. His conduct included calling a co-worker a "lesbian,"
arriving adorned in women's make-up, commenting that specific
patients would make good "drag queens," and squeezing the leg of
another male co-worker.21 0
The court declined to discuss Safransky's claim that his off-
duty association with other homosexuals was constitutionally pro-
tected since his dismissal was predicated solely on speech and con-
duct occurring on the job.""' The court held that Safransky's right
of free speech was not violated.212 It found substantial evidence
that Safransky, by his conduct, was unfit to perform his duties
since his actions adversely affected patient's welfare and disrupted
his relationship with co-workers. 1
208. Id. at 500-01 (citations omitted).
209. 62 Wis. 2d 464, 215 N.W.2d 379 (1974).
210. Id. at 468-69, 215 N.W.2d at 384-85.
211. See note 132 supra.
212. "[D]espite the fact that defendant's actions came within the general area pro-
tected by the First Amendment, the fact that he chose to exercise that right in a mental
ward excepted his conduct from constitutional protection.
"Defendant's conduct might be tolerated under different circumstances such as a con-
frontation on a public street. It cannot be tolerated in a mental hospital ward in the pres-
ence of numerous patients." 62 Wis. 2d at 478, 215 N.W.2d at 385 (quoting State v. Elson,
60 Wis. 2d 54, 61, 208 N.W.2d 363, 367 (1973).
213. 62 Wis. 2d at 478, 215 N.W.2d at 385.
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Adverse employment action short of dismissal may also raise
First Amendment issues. In Gish v. Board of Education,214 the
Board of Education directed a tenured teacher to undergo psychi-
atric evaluation as a result of his activities in support of gay rights.
In June of 1972, Gish became president of the New Jersey Gay
Activists Alliance. He promoted the alliance through public media
communication and aided in organizing a gay caucus at a National
Education Association Convention. The Board's directive was is-
sued after consultation with the Board's psychiatrist who opined
that Gish's overt, public behavior might endanger the psychologi-
cal well-being of his students. Gish contended that compliance
with the Board's directive had a chilling effect on his rights of as-
sociation and speech.
Gish's contention was rejected by the court, which found that
any impingement of his rights was de minimus. On balance, the
Board's interest was substantial and the narrow impact of its regu-
lation reasonable.
The board does not question the right to Gish to say or to do
any of the things which are mentioned in the statement of rea-
sons. It simply contends that, as it has determined with the sup-
portive corroboration of two psychiatrists, Gish's actions display
evidence of deviation from normal mental health which may af-
fect his ability to teach, discipline and associate with the
students.
The submission by Gish to a psychiatric examination takes
nothing from his [sic] except his time. His status as a teacher
continues with full rights under the law. Therefore, from the
standpoint of his being deprived of a right or privilege it is mini-
mal, except as it may loom in his mind.215
The case which provides the most extensive analysis of First
Amendment issues which a homosexual public employee can assert
under section 1983 is Aumiller v. University of Delaware.216
Aumiller was a non-tenured university lecturer who taught one
course, directed the theater, supervised the Summer Festival of the
Arts and managed the Performing Arts Series. After his second
year in this capacity, the university declined to renew his contract,
214. 145 N.J. Super. 96, 366 A.2d 1337 (1976), cert. denied., 434 U.S. 879 (1976).
215. Id. at 104, 107, 366 A.2d at 1341-42, 1343.
216. 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977).
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primarily because he made public statements about homosexuality
which appeared in three newspaper articles.
Two university officials were aware of Aumiller's homosexual-
ity when he was hired. As a graduate student, he had joined the
Gay Community, a homophile organization officially recognized by
the university. After he was hired, Aumiller accepted the Gay
Community's invitation to serve as faculty advisor. In July of 1975,
an article quoting statements by Aumiller and excerpts from a let-
ter he wrote in his capacity as faculty adviser appeared in a local
newspaper, the Sunday Bullentin. University officials were con-
cerned that Aumiller's private life not be publicized in a manner
embarrassing to the university but this concern was not communi-
cated to Aumiller. He was rehired for a second year.
Another reporter contacted Aumiller to obtain information for
an article headlining the Gay Community. Photographs of Aumil-
ler were taken at the university theater during a play rehearsal.
During the same month, two reporters from the campus newspaper
contacted Aumiller for interviews regarding a two-part article on
the Gay Community.
The president of the university expressed concern over the
second newspaper article, Aumiller's homosexual evangelism, and
the potential embarrassment to the university.21 7 A month later, he
refused to renew Aumiller's contract on the ground that Aumiller
advocated a homosexual lifestyle for students,21 8 and used his
faculty position to expound his viewpoint.2 19
Aumiller alleged a violation of his rights of free expression and
association. The court agreed that the newspaper articles precipi-
tated the University's decision not to renew Aumiller's contract
and proceeded to examine what limitations the university could
impose on employees' exercise of First Amendment rights in light
of Pickering.
Where the statements can be shown or presumed to impede the
teacher's proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom;
to have substantially disrupted the regular operation of the school
generally; to have violated an express need for confidentiality, or
where "the relationship between superior and subordinate is of
217. Id. at 1284.
218. Id. at 1285.
219. Id.
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such a personal and intimate nature that certain forms of public
criticism of the superior by the subordinate would seriously un-
dermine the effectiveness of the working relationship," the inter-
est of the school administration in limiting the teachers' contribu-
tion to public debate generally will outweigh the individual
teacher's interest in commenting upon matters of public concern.
However, where none of these enumerated factors is present, the
Court indicated that the interest of the state is not significantly
greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any
member of the general public, and absent proof of false state-
ments knowingly or recklessly made by the teacher, a teacher's
exercise of his right to speak out on issues of public importance
may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public
employment.22 0
As in Pickering, Aumiller's statements neither impeded his job
performance nor resulted in a breach of confidence or a substantial
disruption of working relationships or university functioning.2 21
Since none of the Pickering limitations applied, the court con-
cluded that:
[T]he interests of the University in regulating Aumiller's right of
free speech are no greater than the interest of the State in regu-
lating any citizen's free speech. Accordingly, only if the defen-
dants can show that Aumiller willfully or recklessly made false
statements can they prevail on the question of whether their ac-
tions violated Aumiller's right to freedom of expression.22
The University had alleged that Aumiller had recklessly cre-
ated the impression he was acting as a university spokesman in
expressing his views to reporters. The court found that the identifi-
cation of Aumiller by his official title and as a faculty adviser cou-
pled with his failure to disclaim specifically he was speaking in an
official capacity did not meet Pickering's recklessness standard.223
The defendants also alleged that Aumiller intentionally or
recklessly made false statements to one reporter. The first state-
ment was that university officials knew he was homosexual when
they hired him, and the second statement implied that one of Gay
Community's purposes was to help members find sex partners. The
court found a legitimate misunderstanding between Aumiller and a
220. Id. at 1292-93 (citations & footnote omitted).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1294-95.
223. Id. at 1295 n.68, 1296-97 nn.70-73.
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reporter concerning the specific individuals who knew of Aumiller's
status. The second statement, because it was taken out of context,
did not rise to the level of recklessness. 2 4
Defendants' third allegation was that Aumiller utilized his
university office and the theater to advance his personal cause and,
thereby, create an impression of university endorsement of a ho-
mosexual lifestyle. The court found that Aumiller's action in this
regard was consistent with his position as a faculty adviser and did
not contravene university policies.225 Finally, the defendants con-
tended Aumiller had an offensive sign in his office which read "The
most difficult step is often the most rewarding-The Gay Commu-
nity"; the court found this to be protected expression which the
university had no substantial interest in removing.226
The court concluded that the university's decision not to re-
new Aumiller's contract was in retaliation for his protected public
statements about homosexuality and thus in violation of Aumiller's
First Amendment rights.227
Defendants countered this finding with the argument that
Aumiller's living arrangement-sharing a house with two students,
one of whom was a homosexual-provided an independent basis
for non-renewal of his contract.22 8 This information was held not to
vitiate the constitutional violation. 2 9 According to the Supreme
Court's decision in Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle,230
the existence of a collateral justification for the non-renewal was
relevant to the remedial phase of the litigation rather than a deter-
mination on the merits.23 1
224. Id. at 1297-98.
225. Id. at 1298-99.
226. Id. at 1299-1300.
227. Id. at 1302.
228. Id. at 1302-04. Defendants interposed two additional defenses: that a tight
budget would have required elimination of Aumiller's position, and that the University's
need to conduct an affirmative action search would have accorded Aumiller a nonpreferen-
tial applicant status. The court found the evidence in support of these contentions at best
speculative, and ordered Aumiller's reinstatement for the 1976-77 term since he would have
occupied that position but for the unconstitutional conduct of defendants. Id. at 1308.
229. Id. at 1303.
230. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
231. "[O]nce a plaintiff has shown that his conduct was constitutionally protected and
was a motivating factor in the defendants' decision not to rehire him, then defendants can
limit plaintiffs remedy by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that they
would have reached the same decision even in the absence of the violation of the protected
right. If this burden is satisfied, the Supreme Court indicated that the plaintiff would not be
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The defendants were unable to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that Aumiller would not have been rehired because
of his living arrangements;282 there was no evidence of a sexual re-
lationship between any of the roommates and, therefore, no
faculty-student sexual relations could be established.3
The court therefore ordered all references to the incident and
lawsuit expunged from Aumiller's record at the university3 4 and
awarded him compensatory and punitive damages.35
E. Peripheral Versus Core Rights
It is apparent from the foregoing cases that First Amendment
interests may be successfully asserted by homosexual litigants.
However, the likelihood of success will in large measure be deter-
mined by the court's analysis of three factors: (1) the type of First
Amendment activity involved; (2) the employee's role-whether an
employee or a citizen-in performing the specific activity; and (3)
the relationship of the employer's proscription to the employee's
particular job or position.
The employee's activity, regardless of where it appears on the
spectrum between pure speech and pure conduct, must be pro-
tected. In the context of homosexual employees, the most fre-
quently asserted bases for denying First Amendment protection
are probably criminality and obscenity. Several courts have recog-
nized criminal homosexual conduct as a justifiable basis for ad-
verse employment action.23  Although the homosexual-obscenity
entitled to reinstatement as a remedy. The purpose of the remedy in such a context is to
restore the plaintiff to the position he would have been in but for the constitutional viola-
tion, but not to place him in a better position than if no violation had occurred." 434 F.
Supp. at 1303.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1304 n.89.
234. Id. at 1309, 1313.
235. Id. at 1309-13. The punitive damages were awarded as to defendant Trabant
only.
236. See, e.g., Moser v. State Bd. of Educ., 22 Cal. App. 3d 988, 101 Cal. Rptr. 86
(1972) (revocation of teaching certificate).
"A major distinction between the instant case and the Morrison situation is that the
conduct engaged in by appellant was criminal....
"The criminal conduct of appellant is very similar to that which was involved in
Sarac .... wherein this court sustained the revocation of the teaching credential of a
teacher who had been convicted on a charge of disorderly conduct arising out of his homo-
sexual advances toward a police officer on a public beach. Although some of the dicta in
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cases are outside the scope of the article, public employment cases
such as Weissbaum v. Hannon37 do suggest that dismissal and
other adverse employment action will be successful where the ac-
tivity is clearly obscene.
It is also important to determine where the activity involved
lies on the speech-conduct spectrum. As illustrated by Acanfora
and Aumiller, pure speech is accorded substantial protection and
any employer regulation restricting it will be examined very care-
fully. Pure association has not been addressed in the context of a
homosexual public employee case. However, the Supreme Court, in
Shelton v. Tucker, a3 stated that the right of association is ','closely
allied to freedom of speech and ... like free speech, lies at the
foundation of a free society. '23
9
In addition, a substantial number of campus recognition cases
have upheld the right of homosexuals to associate for political or
social reasons.240 Even in states proscribing homosexual conduct,
the courts recognize associational rights and eschew allegations
that mere association raises the presumption that illegal conduct is
afoot or that the objective of such association is to engage in pro-
scribed activity.24'
As the First Amendment activity attenuates from the core or
fundamental rights of pure speech and association toward periph-
eral rights involving free expression and protected conduct, the
employer's burden of establishing his freedom to regulate the ac-
tivity also attenuates. Association of homosexuals may be
equivalent to assembly when it involves the goal of petitioning for
legal or legislative reform. This was indicated by the district court
Sarac was disapproved in Morrison, the decision was undisturbed in its essential holding
that the evidence of homosexual behavior in a public place constituted sufficient proof of
unfitness for service in the public school system." Id. at 990-92, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 88 (cita-
tion omitted). See generally Sarac v. State Bd. of Educ., 249 Cal. App. 2d 58, 57 Cal. Rptr.
69 (1967) (revocation of teaching certificate after conviction for public homosexual conduct).
237. 439 F. Supp. 873 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
238. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
239. Id. at 486. See also De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
240. See Gay Lib v. University of Missouri, 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1080, rehearing denied, 435 U.S. 981 (1978); Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews,
544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976); Gay Students Organization v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir.
1974); Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
241. See Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976). This
same conclusion was reached in the context of heterosexual conduct involving a teacher in
Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973).
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in Acanfora.42 Or association may, as in the context of the campus
recognition cases, involve membership in a group as a means of
expressing one's philosophy or attitude.243 This communicative
conduct was at issue in McConnell and Singer.
McConnell's claim that his attempt to marry a male was sym-
bolic speech was, in dicta, rejected by the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, 44 thus leaving the employer's disciplinary action to be
judged by a lesser standard than that applicable to cases involving
communicative conduct. Singer involved essentially the same con-
duct and outcome in the federal sector. 45
As the Supreme Court has indicated in Kelley v. Johnson246
and Quinn v. Muscare, peripheral First Amendment rights of
public employees may be curtailed more sharply than core rights,
and the employer's justification for the regulation of peripheral
rights may be less substantial than that needed to support regula-
tion of core rights. The Supreme Court upheld the police force
hair-length regulation in Kelley, and upheld another grooming reg-
ulation in a similar context in Quinn.
The Court in Kelley stated:
More recently, we have sustained comprehensive and substantial
restrictions upon activities of both federal and state employees
lying at the core of the First Amendment.... If such state regu-
lations may survive challenges based on the explicit language of
the First Amendment, there is surely even more room for restric-
tive regulations of state employees where the claim implicates
only the more general contours of the substantive liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.24 8
Closely allied to the Court's analysis of the type of activity
involved and the permissible sweep of employer regulations is its'
analysis of the employee's role while engaging in the activity. As in
Kelley, employer regulations touching the employee as an em-
ployee may cut a much broader path than those which affect the
242. See note 197 and accompanying text supra.
243. E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
244. 451 F.2d at 196 n.7.
245. 530 F.2d at 256.
246. 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
247. 425 U.S. 560 (1976).
248. 425 U.S. at 245 (citations omitted).
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employee as a citizen. 49
The employer can most easily justify and apply regulations
which are directed at pure conduct, as demonstrated by the Su-
preme Court's upholding of Hatch Acts.250 The Hatch Act cases
involve legislation aimed at specific types of partisan activity
which history has demonstrated have an adverse effect on the effi-
ciency of the service and the public's perception of agency action.
Although such acts have the potential for application to otherwise
protected activities, the Supreme Court has indicated a willingness
to deal with these intrusions on an ad hoc basis.251 It appears,
then, that employer regulations which regulate or prohibit em-
ployee homosexual conduct and secondarily impact on core First
Amendment rights may be upheld if there is actual evidence that
such conduct affects the integrity of the employer-agency. For ex-
ample, in Safransky,.52 the employer's dismissal of Safransky was
held to be proper in light of Safransky's homosexual conduct while
on the job. In contrast, in Norton,253 off-duty homosexual conduct
was held not to constitute an adequate basis for dismissal since the
conduct did not affect the integrity of the employer-agency. What
distinguishes the two cases is that in the former the employer
sought to regulate employee conduct while on the job, whereas in
the latter the employer sought to regulate the conduct of the em-
ployee in his off-duty role as citizen.
In both Aumiller and Acanfora, the employer tried to regulate
the speech of the employees who. were, like Pickering, speaking as
individuals of the general public. Thus, the employers were held to
a higher standard of justification than are employers seeking to
regulate either an employee's exercise of a First Amendment right
in his role as an employee or an employee's exercise of a peripheral
First Amendment right.
These distinctions aside, the right of the individual to associ-
ate with others of his or her choice may emanate from the sphere
of privacy which the Supreme Court has recognized as a funda-
249. Id. at 245, 248.
250. See notes 178-79 and accompanying text supra.
251. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548, 580 (1973).
252. See notes 209-13 and accompanying text supra.
253. See notes 21-41 and accompanying text supra.
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mental right. 54 Accordingly, these overlapping First Amendment
rights may also be subsumed by a protected interest in privacy.
F. Privacy
In his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 255 Justice Bran-
deis said of the right to privacy: "The makers of our Constitution
.sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights of man and the right most valued by civilized men." 258
As with First Amendment rights, the right of privacy is a fun-
damental right.251 7 Unlike the rights specifically enumerated in the
Bill of Rights, however, privacy is a nebulous right with ill-defined
parameters. The source of this right to privacy has, in various con-
texts, been deemed to be the unenumerated rights of the Ninth
Amendment,258 rights implicit in the guarantee of freedom in the
Fourteenth Amendment,25 9 and the penumbra surrounding one or
more of the protected interests specifically enumerated in the Bill
of Rights.26 0 An example of the latter is the peripheral First
Amendment right to privacy in one's associations which the Su-
preme Court recognized in NAACP v. Button. e1
Parameters of the evolving right to privacy are designated
zones or areas of privacy. Thus far, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized zones of privacy relative to specific places, 262 intimate, pro-
tected relationships,263 and fundamental rights that are implicit in
individual autonomy,2" such as the personal intimacies of the
home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation and child
rearing. 265
254. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, rehearing denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973); Stan-
ley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
255. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 478.
257. E.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
258. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., with Brennan,
J., concurring).
259. Id. at 502-07 (White, J., concurring).
260. Id. at 484.
261. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
262. Id.
263. Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973). See also id. at 66 n.13.
264. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
265. See id.; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1922).
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Although the right of privacy is not absolute, the government
cannot intrude upon these protected zones absent a compelling
state interest.266 The government, as employer, may not condition
employment on a waiver of the right to privacy; however, it can
burden this right to a greater extent than can the government.
When the government is the employer, however, the courts require
a rational nexus between the government employment policies and
job performance.' 67
For example, in Mindel v. United States Civil Service Com-
mission,6 8 a postal clerk was terminated for immoral conduct be-
cause he was living with a woman without the benefit of marriage.
The postal clerk, Mindel, alleged that his termination violated due
process and his right to privacy. The Court concluded that
Mindel's right of privacy had been violated: "The government can-
not condition employment on the waiver of a constitutional right
... even in cases where it has a legitimate interest, it may not
invade 'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' "269
Likewise, in- Gayer v. Laird,70 the district court held that
"[i]n normal circumstances, there is a right under the First
Amendment for an individual to keep private the details of his sex
life, and this applies to homosexuals, professed or otherwise. 27 1
The appellate court affirmed the district court holding not on First
Amendment grounds, but because an executive order expressed a
policy of deference to individuals' rights of privacy.2 7 2
Applying these holdings to the homosexual employment con-
text, although the federal government may elicit information from
its employees or applicants regarding their homosexual contacts,
questions must be limited to information reasonably necessary to
make an employment determination based on specific criteria for-
mulated by the employer-agency.278
Relying on federal sector cases, the court in Morrison recog-
nized the balance betwen regulations permitting adverse employ-
266. See notes 257 & 263-65 supra.
267. 417 F.2d at 1165.
268. 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Ca. 1970).
269. Id. at 488 (citations omitted).
270. 332 F. Supp. 169 (D.D.C. 1971).
271. Id. at 171.
272. Gayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 740, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
273. Id. (citing Scott v. Macy, 402 F.2d at 648).
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ment actions for "immorality" and potential privacy invasions by
probing employers.7 4 To avoid such potentially intrusive practices,
the court implied a nexus requirement in the regulation governing
license revocation: "By limiting the application of that section to
conduct shown to indicate unfitness to teach, we substantially re-
duce the incentive to inquire into the private lives of otherwise
sound and competent teachers. 27 5
The nexus requirement assures both that the employer's due
process and the employee's right of privacy will remain intact.
"The right of practice one's profession is sufficiently precious to
surround it with a panoply of legal protection"... , and terms
such as "immoral," "unprofessional," and "moral turpitude" con-
stitute only lingual abstractions until applied to a specific occupa-
tion and given content by reference to fitness for the performance
of that vocation.
The power of the state to regulate professions and conditions
of government employment must not arbitrarily impair the right
of the individual to live his private life, apart from his job, as he
deems fit.276
The district court in Fisher v. Snyder 77 agreed that a zone of
privacy, emanating from the First Amendment, exists in one's
home. Fisher's teaching contract was determined to have been im-
permissibly terminated when the school board inferred impropri-
ety from her allowing men to stay at her apartment overnight. Re-
lying on the Supreme Court's recognition of the right to privacy in
one's associations, Chief Judge Urbom concluded "that the associa-
tion of persons within' one's home is an activity constitutionally
protected within the meaning of the right of privacy.12 78
Not all courts agree. In Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Li-
brary,7 9 for example, the district court upheld dismissal of two
employees, one of whom was pregnant, for living together in "open
adultery." Despite Supreme Court decisions concerning the right
of privacy, the district court concluded that:
[n]othing ... in these decisions concerning the right of privacy,
intimates that there is any "fundamental" privacy right "implicit
274. 1 Cal. 3d at 233, 461 P.2d at 390, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
275. Id. at 234, 461 P.2d at 390-91, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 190-91.
276. Id. at 239, 461 P.2d at 394, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 194 (citation omitted).
277. 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972).
278. Id. at 400.
279. 436 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
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in the concept of ordered liberty" for two persons, one of whom is
married, to live together under the circumstances of this case. We
conclude, therefore, that plaintiffs' discharges were not violative
of their constitutional right of privacy.8 0
The court's failure to find a privacy right in Hollenbaugh may be
attributable to the criminality of the conduct/relationship of the
parties, although the court did not specify a basis for finding no
right of privacy.
Criminal proscription of specific sexual conduct should not,
however, foreclose a finding that such conduct may, in some con-
texts, be protected by a right of privacy. Statutes proscribing
adult, consensual homosexual acts, in private, are increasingly sub-
jected to constitutional attack. States such as California and
Washington have repealed such statutes.281 Other states, like
Texas and Alaska, have recognized potential constitutional infir-
mity in their sodomy statutes as applied to private, adult, consen-
sual activity.282
In Stanley v. Georgia,283 the Supreme Court recognized that
proscribed activity in the privacy of one's home which imposes no
threat of harm to the community, is protected by an independent
right of privacy.284 The District Court of Maryland applied such an
analysis in Acanfora and concluded that:
[T]he time has come today for private, consenting, adult homo-
sexuality to enter the sphere of constitutionally protectable inter-
ests. Intolerance of the unconventional halts the growth of
liberty.
Great concepts like ... "liberty" . were purposely left to
gather meaning from experience. For they relate to the whole do-
main of social and economic fact, and the statesmen who founded
this Nation knew too well that only a stagnant society remains
280. Id. at 1334.
281. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 286, 286.1, 288, 288a (1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.79.100 (repealed 1975).
282. See, e.g., Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971); Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F.
Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1969). The Harris Court
in dicta stated: "If the case at bar concerned private, consensual conduct with no visible
impact upon other persons, at least some of us might perceive a right to privacy claim as
one of the penumbral emanations of the Bill of Rights and 14th Amendment due process
clause, or simply as one of the unenumerated rights guaranteed by the 9th Amendment." Id.
at 648.
283. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
284. Id. at 568.
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unchanged... 285
The court, in dicta, found no compelling interest to support Mary-
land's proscription of private, adult, consensual homosexual activ-
ity and, by implication, found insufficient state-employer interest
to warrant the sweeping infringment on privacy inherent in basing
employment decisions on private homosexual conduct proscribed
by the Maryland statute, since "homosexuality per se does not pre-
clude successful job performance."2 6
In attempting to effectuate its interests, the employer often
intrudes into the applicant's or employee's innermost beliefs, feel-
ings and cherished relationships, as Norton and Morrison feared.
With the increasingly burgeoning intrusion of government into the
lives of its citizenry and the legislative recognition of the individ-
ual's need to preserve an enclave of privacy,2 87 it is clearly time to
recognize privacy in the conduct of the adult's private, consensual
sexual practices as a fundamental right. Those states in which such
conduct is no longer criminal have recognized that sexual conduct
within one's sphere of privacy may not be inquired into by the gov-
ernment, because it has no legitimate interest.28 8 Similarly, the em-
ployer has no legitimate interest in his employee's sexual conduct
absent a nexus between the conduct and job performance.289 Only
by adherence to this standard can the individual's right to privacy
in his associations be more than a hollow concept: "[U]nless a de-
liberate attempt is to be made by society, acting through the
agency of the law, to equate the sphere of crime with that of sin,
there must remain a realm of private morality and immorality
which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's business. "290 This
applies with equal force to the employer: private sexual conduct is
not his business.
285. 359 F. Supp. at 851 (citations omitted).
286. Id. at 851. The district court concluded, however, that Acanfora exceeded the
zone of privacy by virtue of his public statements. Id. at 856. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed on other, unrelated grounds. 491 F.2d at 499. The Fourth Circuit's only
comment on the right of privacy, discussed at length in the lower court opinion, was in
relation to Acanfora's omission of relevant information from his employment application.
Id. at 501-04.
287. Id. at 856.
288. See Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d at 502.
289. 417 F.2d at 1165.




[D]iscrimination in employment is one of the most deplorable
forms of discrimination known to our society, for it deals not with
just an individual's sharing in the "outer benefits" of being an
American citizen, but rather the ability to provide decently for
one's family in a job or profession for which he qualifies and
chooses.2 91
Discrimination in employment is particularly odious when
practiced by public employers, because the general public must of
necessity support such discrimination. Ever-increasing reliance on
government agencies renders it impossible to boycott government
services in order to pressure agencies into nondiscriminatory em-
ployment practices. Moreover, government employment opportuni-
ties constitute a substantial segment of jobs within the employ-
ment sector of this society, particularly when the impact and
quantity of government contracts are considered. For individuals
highly trained in specialized areas, a foreclosure of public sector
employment may effectively end their careers.
These effects taken together have a corollary effect on the gov-
ernment. Denial of employment to homosexuals circumscribes the
pool of manpower resources from which the government seeks to
lure quality employees. It negates the merit system principles
which replace the archaic patronage system. In addition, public
sector discrimination is incompatible with the government's dual
role as the protectorate of constitutional principles.
The homosexual public employee can pursue his battle in the
courts, as well as in the legislatures, to achieve equal employment
opportunities in the public sector. In doing so, a vital tool exists in
the Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Acts to preserve the integrity
of constitutional guarantees. The homosexual public employee or
applicant may assert as protected interests under section 1983 the
same interests which would support a direct constitutional attack
against employer-agency adverse action.
Prior to pursuing litigation, consideration should be directed
towards several factors. First, the potential litigant should deter-
mine the remedy which he desires and then consider the alterna-
tive forums open to him. For example, removal of stigmatizing in-
291. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970).
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formation may be possible via a state-created mechanism which
operates more quickly than the judicial process. Where reinstate-
ment or backpay is desired, the litigant may find that a state con-
stitution or laws are interpreted more liberally than the federal
statute and therefore afford him a tactical advantage.29 2
A second factor the homosexual litigant must consider is his
status as a protected or unprotected employee. He must familiarize
himself with the regulations governing the terms of his employ-
ment and the scope of his substantive rights as defined by those
provisions. In the absence of explicit provisions, the employee
should determine whether a de facto system, as liberally described
in Ashton v. Civiletti,293 exists. If a regulatory system exists, but
the agency's practice differs substantially and consistently from
the regulatory scheme, the employee may be able to establish a de
facto system, and estop the agency from asserting the regulatory
scheme as a defense.
If the employee can establish no de facto, statutory, or con-
tractual property right, his remedy will, in all likelihood, not in-
clude reinstatement.
The third factor the employee must consider is the on-duty or
off-duty nature of his homosexual status, speech or conduct. Off-
duty activity necessarily raises due process considerations, as well
as the issue of infringement or chilling of rights to speech, associa-
tion and privacy. Further, the employer may be acting as govern-
ment-versus-employer and, thus, be held to a higher standard of
justification by the courts. If the employee is being penalized for
speech or status, due process and equal protection interests, as well
as First Amendment rights, are affected. If conduct is at issue, the
employee must determine the status of the criminal law and con-
sider its effect on his case. To blunt the effectiveness of the em-
ployer's argument that conduct is violative of criminal laws and,
hence, contrary to public policy, the employee should assert a pri-
vacy interest.
The strongest case a homosexual litigant can assert is one with
the dual prongs of a property interest and a "pure" liberty inter-
est. The courts necessarily keenly scrutinize employer regulations
292. See, e.g., Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595
P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979), vacating 65 Cal. App. 3d 608, 135 Cal. Rptr. 465.
293. 48 U.S.L.W. 2261 (Ct. App. D.C. Oct. 4, 1979).
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curtailing the exercise of liberty. When a liberty interest is vio-
lated, the litigant's property interest will afford him a substantially
greater measure of relief (especially if reinstatement is vital to
him) than he could obtain for violation of either a property inter-
est circumscribed by statute or a liberty interest.
But perhaps most importantly, the homosexual litigant should
act with confidence:
[T]he struggle of the homosexual community for equal rights,
particulary in the field of employment, must be recognized as a
political activity. Indeed the subject of the rights of homosexuals
incites heated political debate today, and the "gay liberation
movement" encourages its homosexual members to attempt to
convince other members of society that homosexuals should be
accorded the same fundamental rights as heterosexuals. The aims
of the struggle for homosexual rights, and the tactics employed,
bear a close analogy to the continuing struggle for civil rights
waged by blacks, women, and other minorities....
A principal barrier to homosexual equality is the common
feeling that homosexuality is an affiction which the homosexual
worker must conceal from his employer and his fellow workers.
Consequently one important aspect of the struggle for equal
rights is to induce homosexual individuals to "come out of the
closet," acknowledge their sexual preferences, and to associate
with others in working for equal rights.2"
294. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 24 Cal. 3d 486, 488, 595 P.2d 592,
610, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 32 (1979).
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